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Abstract
The results in this paper add useful tools to the theory of sets of desirable gambles, a
growing toolbox for reasoning with partial probability assessments. We investigate how to
combine a number of marginal coherent sets of desirable gambles into a joint set using the
properties of epistemic irrelevance and independence. We provide formulas for the smallest
such joint, called their independent natural extension, and study its main properties. The
independent natural extension of maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles allows us to
define the strong product of sets of desirable gambles. Finally, we explore an easy way to
generalise these results to also apply for the conditional versions of epistemic irrelevance and
independence. Having such a set of tools that are easily implemented in computer programs
is clearly beneficial to fields, like AI, with a clear interest in coherent reasoning under
uncertainty using general and robust uncertainty models that require no full specification.
1. Introduction
In reasoning and decision making under uncertainty, there is little doubt that probabili-
ties play the leading part. Imprecise probability models provide a well-founded extension
to probabilistic reasoning, that allow us to deal with incomplete probability assessments,
indecision and robustness issues.1
Early imprecise probability models (going back to, amongst others, Bernoulli (1713),
Boole (1952, 1961) and Koopman (1940)) centered on lower and upper probabilities for
events or propositions. In later stages (see for instance the work of Smith (1961), Williams
(1975b) and, for the clearest statement, Walley (1991, Section 2.7)), it became apparent
that the language of events and lower probabilities is lacking in power of expression, and that
a much more expressive theory can be built using random variables and lower previsions
(or lower expectations), instead.2 However, even though it has been quite successful, and
is by now quite well developed, there are a number of problems with the lower prevision
approach. Its mathematical complexity is fairly high, especially when conditioning and
1. To get a good idea of what the field of imprecise probabilities is about, and how it is evolving, browse
through the online proceedings of the biennial ISIPTA conferences, to be found on the web site (www.
sipta.org) of the Society for Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications.
2. In contrast, for precise probability models, the expressive power of probabilities and expectations is
the same: a linear prevision or expectation on the set of all (bounded) real-valued maps is uniquely
determined by its restriction to events (a finitely additive probability), and vice versa.
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independence enter the picture. Also, the coherence requirements, which specify basic
rules for proper inference using (conditional) lower previsions, are quite cumbersome, and
rather harder to chop down into intuitive elementary building blocks than their precise-
probabilistic counterparts, even though the latter turn out to be special instances of the
former. Finally, as is the case with many other approaches to probability, and as we will
see further on, the theory of coherent lower previsions has issues with conditioning on sets
of probability zero.
A very attractive solution to these problems was offered by Walley (2000), in the form
of sets of desirable gambles. Walley’s work was inspired by earlier ideas by Smith (1961)
and Williams (1975b), but previous work along these lines was also done by Seidenfeld,
Schervish, and Kadane (1995). On this approach, the primitive notions are not probabilities
of events, nor expectations of random variables. Rather, the starting point is the question
whether a gamble, or a risky transaction, is desirable to a subject, i.e. strictly preferred to
the zero transaction, or status quo. A basic belief model is then not a probability measure,
nor a lower prevision, but a set of desirable gambles.
Let us briefly summarise here why we believe working with sets of desirable gambles as
basic belief models deserves more attention in the AI community:
Primo, as a number of examples in the literature have shown (Couso & Moral, 2011;
De Cooman & Quaeghebeur, 2012; Moral, 2005), and as we shall see further on (look for
instance at Examples 1 and 2), working with and making inferences using a set of desirable
gambles as a subject’s uncertainty model is more general and more expressive. It is also
arguably simpler and more elegant from a mathematical point of view, and it has a very
intuitive geometrical interpretation (Quaeghebeur, 2012b).
Secundo, we shall see in Sections 4 and 5 that the approach to coherent marginalisation
and conditioning is especially straightforward, and there are no issues with conditioning on
sets of probability zero.
Tertio, as we will argue in Section 2.3, because of the similarity between accepting a
gamble on the one hand, and accepting a proposition to be true on the other, working with
sets of desirable gambles leads to an account of probabilistic inference with a very ‘logical’
flavour; see the work by Moral and Wilson (1995) for an early discussion of this idea.
Quarto, working with sets of desirable gambles encompasses and subsumes as special
cases both classical (or ‘precise’) probabilistic inference and inference in classical proposi-
tional logic; see Sections 2 and 5.
And finally, quinto, as will be made clear by the discussion throughout, sets of desirable
gambles are eminently suited for dealing with partial probability assessments, in situations
where experts express their beliefs, preferences or behavioural dispositions using finitely
many assessments that need not determine a unique probability measure. In particular, we
will discuss the connection with partial preferences in Section 2.1.
Let us try and present a preliminary defense of these sweeping claims with a few ex-
amples. One particular perceived disadvantage of working with lower previsions—or with
previsions and probabilities for that matter—is that conditioning a lower prevision need not
lead to uniquely coherent results when the conditioning event has lower or upper probability
zero; see for instance (Walley, 1991, Section 6.4). For precise probabilities, this difficulty
can be circumvented by using full conditional measures (Dubins, 1975). As we have already
mentioned, in an imprecise-probabilities context, working with the more informative coher-
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ent sets of desirable gambles rather than with lower previsions provides a very elegant and
intuitively appealing way out of this problem, as Walley has already suggested in (Walley,
1991, Section 3.8.6 and Appendix F), and argued in much more detail in (Walley, 2000).
The connection between full conditional measures and maximal coherent sets of desirable
gambles was recently explored by Couso and Moral (2011): the latter are still more general
and expressive.
The work by De Cooman and Quaeghebeur (2012) has shown that working with sets
of desirable gambles is especially illuminating in the context of modelling exchangeability
assessments: it exposes the simple geometrical meaning of the notion of exchangeability,
and leads to a simple and particularly elegant proof of a significant generalisation to de
Finetti’s representation theorem for exchangeable random variables (de Finetti, 1931).
Exchangeability is a structural assessment, and so is independence, quite common in
the context of probabilistic graphical models, such as Bayesian (Pearl, 1985) or credal net-
works (Cozman, 2000). Conditioning and independence are, of course, closely related. In a
recent paper (De Cooman, Miranda, & Zaffalon, 2011), we investigated the notions of epis-
temic independence of finite-valued variables using coherent lower previsions, thus adding
to the literature where assessments of epistemic irrelevance and independence are studied
for graphical models (De Cooman, Hermans, Antonucci, & Zaffalon, 2010; Destercke & De
Cooman, 2008), as an alternative to the more often used notion of strong independence.
The above-mentioned problems with conditioning, and the fact that the coherence require-
ments for conditional lower previsions are, to be honest, quite cumbersome to work with,
have turned this into a quite complicated exercise. This is the reason why, in the present
paper, we intend to show that looking at independence using sets of desirable gambles leads
to a more elegant theory that avoids some of the complexity pitfalls of working with coher-
ent lower previsions. In doing this, we build on the strong pioneering work on epistemic
irrelevance by Moral (2005). While we focus here on the symmetrised notion of epistemic
independence, much of what we do can be seen as an application and continuation of his
ideas.
Our goal in this paper is to show how local models for some variables, together with
independence assessments, can be combined in order to produce a joint model. This joint
model can then be used to draw inferences, as is done for instance in the context of Bayesian
or credal networks (Antonucci, de Campos, & Zaffalon, 2012; Cozman, 2000; Pearl, 1985).
One of the core ideas of such probabilistic graphical models is to provide a representation
of this joint model that is less taxing from a computational point of view.
There are three main novelties to our approach: the first is that we allow for imprecision
in the local models—although precise models are a particular case; the second is that we
model local probability assessments by means of sets of desirable gambles, because of the
above-mentioned advantages they possess over coherent lower previsions; and the third
is that we stress epistemic irrelevance and independence rather than the more common
assessment strong independence, for reasons that will become clear further on—although
we also discuss strong independence.
With the results in this paper we are adding useful tools to the growing toolbox for
reasoning with partial probability assessments that sets of desirable gambles constitute,
something already started in our work on exchangeability (De Cooman & Quaeghebeur,
2012) and the work on epistemic irrelevance and credal networks by Moral (2005). In this
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regard, it is also interesting to mention that algorithms for making inferences with sets
of desirable gambles have been recently established (Couso & Moral, 2011; Quaeghebeur,
2012a). Having such a set of tools that are easily implemented in computer programs is
clearly beneficial to a field like AI, which should surely be interested in coherent reasoning
under uncertainty with general and robust uncertainty models that require no full speci-
fication. This paper constitutes a further step in that direction, and it also allows us to
see more clearly which are the main difficulties faced when working with sets of desirable
gambles. There remain, however, a number of important situations to be dealt with, and
future lines of research are discussed in a number of places in the paper, as well as in the
Conclusion.
In Section 2 we summarise relevant results in the existing theory of sets of desirable
gambles. After mentioning useful notational conventions in Section 3, we recall the basic
marginalisation, conditioning and extension operations for sets of desirable gambles in Sec-
tions 4 and 5. We use these to combine a number of marginal sets of desirable gambles into
a joint satisfying epistemic irrelevance (Section 6), and epistemic independence (Section 7).
In Section 8, we study the particular case of maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles,
and derive the concept of a strong product. Section 9 deals with conditional independence
assessments.
2. Coherent sets of desirable gambles and natural extension
Let us begin by explaining what our basic uncertainty models, coherent sets of desirable
gambles, are about. More details can be found in (Augustin, Coolen, De Cooman, &
Troffaes, 2012; Couso & Moral, 2011; De Cooman & Quaeghebeur, 2012; Moral, 2005;
Walley, 2000).
Consider a variable X taking values in some possibility space X , which we assume in this
paper to be finite.3 We model information about X by means of sets of desirable gambles.
A gamble is a real-valued function on X , and we denote the set of all gambles on X by G(X).
It is a linear space under point-wise addition of gambles, and point-wise multiplication of
gambles with real numbers. For any subset A of G(X), we denote by posi(A) the set of all
positive linear combinations of gambles in A:
posi(A) :=
{ n∑
k=1
λkfk : fk ∈ A, λk > 0, n > 0
}
.
We call A a convex cone if it is closed under positive linear combinations, meaning that
posi(A) = A.
For any two gambles f and g on X , we write ‘f ≥ g’ if (∀x ∈ X)f(x) ≥ g(x), and
‘f > g’ if f ≥ g and f 6= g. A gamble f > 0 is called positive. A gamble g ≤ 0 is called
non-positive. G(X) 6=0 denotes the set of all non-zero gambles, G(X)>0 the convex cone of
all positive gambles, and G(X)≤0 the convex cone of all non-positive gambles.
3. All the results in this section remain valid when working with more general, possibly infinite, possibility
spaces, and in that case gambles are assumed to be bounded real-valued functions. We make this finite-
ness assumption here to avoid having to deal with the controversial issue of conglomerability (Miranda,
Zaffalon, & De Cooman, 2012; Walley, 1991), because it will make the discussion of independence in
later sections significantly easier, and because most practically implementable inference systems in AI
are finitary in any case.
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2.1 Coherence and avoiding non-positivity
Definition 1 (Avoiding non-positivity and coherence). We say that a set of desir-
able gambles D ⊆ G(X) avoids non-positivity if f 6≤ 0 for all gambles f in posi(D), or
in other words if G(X)≤0 ∩ posi(D) = ∅. It is called coherent if it satisfies the following
requirements:
D1. 0 /∈ D;
D2. G(X)>0 ⊆ D;
D3. D = posi(D).
We denote by D(X) the set of all coherent sets of desirable gambles on X.
Requirement D3 turns D into a convex cone. Due to D2, it includes G(X)>0; due to D1–D3,
it excludes G(X)≤0, and therefore avoids non-positivity:
D4. if f ≤ 0 then f /∈ D, or equivalently G(X)≤0 ∩ D = ∅.
The set G(X)>0 is coherent, and it is the smallest such subset of G(X). This set represents
minimal commitments on the part of the subject, in the sense that if he knows nothing
about the likelihood of the different outcomes he will only prefer to zero those gambles
which are sure to never decrease his wealth and have a possibility of increasing it. Hence,
it is usually taken to model complete ignorance, and it is called the vacuous model.
One interesting feature of coherent sets of desirable gambles is that they are linked to the
field of decision making with incomplete preferences (Aumann, 1962; Dubra, Maccheroni,
& Ok, 2004; Shapley & Baucells, 1998), because they are formally equivalent to the strict
versions of partial preference orderings (Buehler, 1976; Giron & Rios, 1980). Given a
coherent set of desirable gambles D, we can define a strict preference relation  between
gambles by
f  g ⇔ f − g ∈ D for any gambles f and g in G(X).
Indeed, due to the linearity of the utility scale, exchanging a gamble g for a gamble f is
a transaction with reward function f − g, and strictly preferring f over g means that this
exchange should be strictly preferred to the status quo (zero). The relation  satisfies the
following conditions:
SP1. f  f for all f ∈ G(X) [irreflexivity]
SP2. f > g ⇒ f  g for all f, g ∈ G(X) [monotonicity]
SP3. f  g and g  h⇒ f  h for all f, g, h ∈ G(X) [transitivity]
SP4. f  g ⇔ µf + (1− µ)h  µg + (1− µ)h for all µ ∈ (0, 1] and f, g, h ∈ G(X) [mixture
independence]
Conversely, any preference relation satisfying the above axioms determines a coherent set of
desirable gambles. Partial preference orderings provide a foundation for a general decision
theory with imprecise probabilities and imprecise utilities (Fishburn, 1975; Seidenfeld et al.,
1995; Seidenfeld, Schervish, & Kadane, 2010). See also Moral and Wilson (1995), Walley
(1991, 2000) and Quaeghebeur (2012b, Section 2.4) for more information.
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2.2 Natural extension
If we consider any non-empty family of coherent sets of desirable gambles Di, i ∈ I, then
their intersection
⋂
i∈I Di is still coherent. This is the idea behind the following result,
which brings to the fore a notion of coherent inference. If a subject gives us an assessment,
a set A ⊆ G(X) of gambles on X that he finds desirable, then it tells us exactly when this
assessment can be extended to a coherent set of desirable gambles, and how to construct
the smallest such set.
Theorem 1 (De Cooman & Quaeghebeur, 2012). Consider A ⊆ G(X), and define
its natural extension by:4
E(A) :=
⋂
{D ∈ D(X) : A ⊆ D} .
Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) A avoids non-positivity;
(ii) A is included in some coherent set of desirable gambles;
(iii) E(A) 6= G(X);
(iv) the set of desirable gambles E(A) is coherent;
(v) E(A) is the smallest coherent set of desirable gambles that includes A.
When any (and hence all) of these equivalent statements hold, then
E(A) = posi(G(X)>0 ∪ A).
This shows that if we have an assessment A with a finite description, we can represent
its natural extension on a computer by storing a finite description of its extreme rays.
Although in general our assessments A need not have a finite description (for instance
those considered in Eq. (3) further on can but need not have one), they will be of interest
in a vast range of practical situations. For a description of the many cases where partial
probability assessments can be given a finite description, and for efficient algorithms for
verifying the coherence or computing the natural extension of a set of gambles, we refer
to Couso and Moral (2011) and Quaeghebeur (2012a).
2.3 Connection with classical propositional logic
The definition of a coherent set of desirable gambles, and Theorem 1, make clear that infer-
ence with desirable gambles bears a formal resemblance to deduction in classical proposition
logic: D3 is a production axiom that states that positive linear combinations of desirable
gambles are again desirable. The exact correspondences are listed in the following table:
Classical propositional logic Sets of desirable gambles
logical consistency avoiding non-positivity
deductively closed coherent
deductive closure natural extension
4. As usual, in this expression, we let
⋂ ∅ = G(X).
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We shall see that this inference with sets of desirable gambles has (precise-)probabilistic
inference, and in particular Bayes’s Rule, as a special case. But it is easy to see that it also
generalises (includes as a special case) classical propositional logic: a proposition p can be
identified with a subset Ap of the Stone space X , and accepting a proposition p corresponds
to judging the gamble IAp − 1 +  to be desirable for all  > 0.5 Here IAp is the so-called
indicator (gamble) of Ap, assuming the value 1 on Ap and 0 elsewhere. See De Cooman
(2005) for a more detailed discussion.
2.4 Helpful lemmas
In order to prove a number of results in this paper, we need the following lemmas, one of
which is convenient version of the separating hyperplane theorem. They rely heavily on the
assumption of a finite space X , and are not easily extended to a more general case.
Lemma 2. Assume that X is finite, and consider a finite subset A of G(X). Then 0 /∈
posi(G(X)>0∪A) if and only if there is some probability mass function p such that p(x) > 0
for all x ∈ X and ∑x∈X p(x)f(x) > 0 for all f ∈ A.
Proof. It clearly suffices to prove necessity. Since 0 /∈ posi(G(X)>0 ∪ A), we infer from a
version of the separating hyperplane theorem (Walley, 1991, Appendix E.1) that there is a
linear functional Λ on G(X) such that
(∀x ∈ X)Λ(I{x}) > 0 and (∀f ∈ A)Λ(f) > 0.
Then Λ(X) = ∑x∈X Λ(I{x}) > 0, and if we let p(x) := Λ(I{x})/Λ(X) > 0 for all x ∈ X ,
then p is a probability mass function on X for which Λ(f)/Λ(X) = ∑x∈X p(x)f(x) > 0 for
all f ∈ A.
Our second lemma implies that if we consider a coherent set of desirable gambles that
does not include a gamble nor its opposite, we can always find a coherent superset that
includes one of the two:
Lemma 3. Consider a convex cone A of gambles on X such that max f > 0 for all f ∈ A.
Consider any non-zero gamble g on X. If g /∈ A then 0 /∈ posi(A ∪ {−g}).
Proof. Consider a non-zero gamble g /∈ A, and assume ex absurdo that 0 ∈ posi(A∪{−g}).
Then it follows from the assumptions that there are f ∈ A and µ > 0 such that 0 =
f + µ(−g). Hence g ∈ A, a contradiction.
2.5 Maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles
An element D of D(X) is called maximal if it is not strictly included in any other element of
D(X), or in other words, if adding any gamble f to D makes sure we can no longer extend
the set D ∪ {f} to a set that is still coherent:
(∀D′ ∈ D(X))(D ⊆ D′ ⇒ D = D′).
5. This is not equivalent to judging the gamble IAp − 1 to be desirable, as in that case we do not obtain
a coherent set of desirable gambles; the gamble IAp − 1 is only almost-desirable in the sense of Walley
(1991, Section 3.7.3).
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M(X) denotes the set of all maximal elements of D(X).
The following proposition provides a useful characterisation of such maximal elements.
Proposition 4 (De Cooman & Quaeghebeur, 2012). Consider any D ∈ D(X). It is
a maximal coherent set of desirable gambles if and only if
(∀f ∈ G(X) 6=0)(f /∈ D ⇒ −f ∈ D).
As is the case for classical propositional logic (see, for instance, De Cooman, 2005),
coherence and inference can be described completely in terms of such maximal elements.
This is the essence of the following important result, which continues to hold for infinite X ,
but for which a constructive proof can be given in case X is finite, based on the argument
suggested by Couso and Moral (2011).
Theorem 5 (Couso & Moral, 2011; De Cooman & Quaeghebeur, 2012). A set A
avoids non-positivity if and only if there is some maximal M ∈ M(X) such that A ⊆ M.
Moreover
E(A) =
⋂
m(A),
where we let
m(A) := {M ∈M(X) : A ⊆M} . (1)
This shows that (coherent) sets of desirable gambles are instances of the so-called strong
belief structures described and studied in detail by De Cooman (2005), into which the strong
belief structures of classical propositional logic can be embedded. This guarantees amongst
other things that an AGM-like (De Cooman, 2005; Ga¨rdenfors, 1988) account of belief
expansion and revision is possible for these objects.
2.6 Coherent lower previsions
We conclude this section by shedding some light on the connection between coherent sets
of desirable gambles, coherent lower previsions, and probabilities.
Given a coherent set of desirable gambles D, the functional P defined on G(X) by
P (f) := sup {µ : f − µ ∈ D} (2)
is a coherent lower prevision (Walley, 1991, Theorem 3.8.1), that is, it corresponds to taking
the lower envelope of the expectations associated with a set of finitely additive probabilities.
The conjugate upper prevision P is defined by P (f) := inf {µ : µ− f ∈ D} = −P (−f).
Many different coherent sets of desirable gambles induce the same coherent lower pre-
vision P , and they typically differ only in their boundaries. In this sense, we can say that
sets of desirable gambles are more informative than coherent lower previsions: although
a gamble with positive lower prevision is always desirable and one with a negative lower
prevision is not desirable, a lower prevision does not generally provide information about
the desirability of a gamble whose lower prevision equal to zero. This is the reason why we
need to consider the sets of desirable gambles if we want to have this additional information.
To see this more clearly, consider the following adaptation of an example by Moral (2005,
Example 1):
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Example 1. Consider X1 = X2 = {a, b}, and let P be the coherent lower prevision on
G(X1 ×X2) given by
P (f) := min
{
f(b, a) + f(b, b)
2
,
f(b, a) + 3f(b, b)
4
}
for all gambles f on X1 ×X2.
This coherent lower prevision is induced by each of the following coherent sets of desirable
gambles by means of Eq. (2):
D := {f : f > 0 or P (f) > 0}
D′ := D ∪ {f : f(b, a) = f(b, b) = 0 and f(a, a) + f(a, b) > 0} .
However, these two sets encode different preferences, as the gamble g given by g(a, a) = 2,
g(a, b) = −1, g(b, a) = g(b, b) = 0, with P (g) = 0, is considered desirable for D′ but not for
D. This is because coherent lower previsions are not able to distinguish between preferences
and weak preferences, while sets of desirable gambles can. We shall see in Section 5 that
these differences come into play when considering conditioning. 
The smallest set of desirable gambles that induces a given coherent lower prevision—an
open cone—is called the associated set of strictly desirable gambles, and is given by
D := {f ∈ G(X) : f > 0 or P (f) > 0} . (3)
This is for instance the case of the set D in Example 1. Sets of strictly desirable gambles
are in a one-to-one relationship with coherent lower previsions, ans as such they suffer from
the same problems when conditioning on sets of (lower) probability zero, in the sense that
in the conditional models they determine in that case—by means of Eqs. (8) and (10) in
Section 5—are always vacuous (Zaffalon & Miranda, 2012; Quaeghebeur, 2012b). This is
one of the reasons why in this paper we are considering the more general model of coherent
sets of (not necessarily strictly) desirable gambles. For additional discussion about why
sets of desirable gambles are more informative than coherent lower previsions, we refer to
Walley (2000) and Quaeghebeur (2012b).
When the lower and the upper prevision coincide on all gambles, then the functional
P defined on G(X) by P(f) := P (f) = P (f) for all f ∈ G(X) is a linear prevision, i.e., it
corresponds to the expectation operator with respect to a finitely additive probability. This
happens in particular if D is a maximal coherent set of desirable gambles M:
P (f) = sup {µ : f − µ ∈M} = inf {µ : f − µ /∈M} = inf {µ : µ− f ∈M} = P (f);
to see why the second equality holds, observe that if f − µ ∈ M then also f − µ′ ∈ M for
all µ′ < µ, and as a consequence the set {µ : f − µ ∈M} is an interval that is unbounded
below. The third equality follows from Proposition 4. Thus, up to boundary behaviour,
precise probability models correspond to a maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles;
see Couso and Moral (2011, Section 5), Miranda and Zaffalon (2010, Proposition 6) and
Williams (1975a) for more information. Moreover, any coherent lower prevision P is the
lower envelope of the credal set M(P ) it induces, given by
M(P ) := {P linear prevision: (∀f ∈ G(X))P(f) ≥ P (f)} .
We can conclude at this point that at least in its basic representational aspects, models
involving coherent sets of desirable gambles generalise both classical propositional logic and
precise probability in its finitary approach championed by de Finetti (1937, 1975).
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3. Basic notation
Now that we have highlighted the basic facts about this more general approach to uncer-
tainty modelling, we are ready to turn to independence. In order to talk about this, we need
to be able to deal with models involving more than one variable. In the present section, we
introduce the notational devices we will use to make this discussion as elegant as possible.
From now on, we consider a number of variables Xn, n ∈ N , taking values in the
respective finite sets Xn. Here N is some finite non-empty index set.6
For every subset R of N , we denote by XR the tuple of variables (with one component
for each r ∈ R) that takes values in the Cartesian product XR := ×r∈RXr. This Cartesian
product is the set of all maps xR from R to
⋃
r∈R Xr such that xr := xR(r) ∈ Xr for all
r ∈ R. Elements of XR are generically denoted by xR or zR, with corresponding components
xr := xR(r) or zr := zR(r), r ∈ R.
We will assume that the variables Xn are logically independent, which means that for
each subset R of N , XR may assume all values in XR.
We denote by G(XR) the set of gambles defined on XR. We will frequently resort to
the simplifying device of identifying a gamble on XR with a gamble on XN , namely its
cylindrical extension. To give an example, if K ⊆ G(XN ), this trick allows us to consider
K∩G(XR) as the set of those gambles in K that depend only on the variable XR. As another
example, this device allows us to identify the gambles I{xR} and I{xR}×XN\R , and therefore
also the events {xR} and {xR} × XN\R. More generally, for any event A ⊆ XR, we can
identify the gambles IA and IA×XN\R , and therefore also the events A and A×XN\R.
We must pay particular attention to the case R = ∅. By definition, X∅ is the set of all
maps from ∅ to ⋃r∈∅Xr = ∅. It contains only one element x∅: the empty map. This means
that there is no uncertainty about the value of the variable X∅: it can assume only one
value (the empty map). Moreover IX∅ = I{x∅} = 1. Also, we can identify G(X∅) with the
set of real numbers R. There is only one coherent set of desirable gambles on X∅: the set
R>0 of positive real numbers.
One final notational convention that is very handy and will be used throughout: if n
is an index, then we identify n and {n}. So we take X{n}, G(X{n}), D{n} to also refer to
Xn, G(Xn) and Dn, respectively. This trick, amongst other things, allows us to consider
two disjoint index sets N1 and N2, and consider each of these sets to constitute an index in
themselves, leading to a new index set {N1, N2}. The variables XN1 and XN2 can then be
combined into a joint variable X{N1,N2}, which can of course be identified with the variable
XN1∪N2 : joint variables can be considered as single variables, and combined to constitute
new joint variables.
4. Marginalisation and cylindrical extension
Suppose that we have a set DN ⊆ G(XN ) of desirable gambles modelling a subject’s infor-
mation about the uncertain variable XN .
6. The assumption of finiteness of the spaces Xn is essential for the proofs of some of the results established
later on, such as Theorem 13 and Proposition 18. It also allows us to simplify some of the expressions of
the sets of gambles derived by an assumption of epistemic irrelevance or independence, from which we
derive for instance Lemma 11 and Proposition 14.
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We are interested in modelling the information about the variable XO, where O is some
subset of N . This can be done using the set of desirable gambles that belong to DN but
only depend on the variable XO:
margO(DN ) := {g ∈ G(XO) : g ∈ DN} = DN ∩ G(XO). (4)
Observe that if DN is coherent we obtain marg∅(DN ) = G(X∅)>0, which can be identified
with the set of positive real numbers R>0. Also, with O1 ⊆ O2 ⊆ N :
margO1(margO2(DN )) =
{
g ∈ G(XO1) : g ∈ margO2(DN )
}
= {g ∈ G(XO1) : g ∈ G(XO2) ∩ DN}
= {g ∈ G(XO1) : g ∈ DN} = margO1(DN ). (5)
Coherence is trivially preserved under marginalisation.
Proposition 6. Let DN be a set of desirable gambles on XN , and consider any subset O
of N .
(i) If DN avoids non-positivity, then so does margO(DN ).
(ii) If DN is coherent, then margO(DN ) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on XO.
We now look for a kind of inverse operation to marginalisation. Suppose we have a
coherent set of desirable gambles DO ⊆ G(XO) modelling a subject’s information about the
uncertain variable XO, and we want to extend this to a coherent set of desirable gambles
on XN , representing the same information. So we are looking for a coherent set of desirable
gambles DN ⊆ G(XN ) such that margO(DN ) = DO and that is as small as possible: the
most conservative coherent set of desirable gambles on XN that marginalises to DO. It
turns out that such a set always exists and is not difficult to find.
Proposition 7. Let O be a subset of N and let DO ∈ D(XO). Then the most conservative
(smallest) coherent set of desirable gambles on XN that marginalises to DO is given by
extN (DO) := posi(G(XN )>0 ∪ DO). (6)
It is called the cylindrical extension of DO to a set of desirable gambles on XN , and clearly
satisfies
margO(extN (DO)) = DO. (7)
This extension is called weak extension by Moral (2005, Section 2.1).7
Proof. It is clear from the coherence requirements and Eq. (4) that any coherent set of
desirable gambles that marginalises to DO must include G(XN )>0 and DO, and therefore
also posi(G(XN )>0∪DO) = extN (DO). It therefore suffices to prove that posi(G(XN )>0∪DO)
is coherent, and that it marginalises to DO.
7. The main difference between our result and Moral’s is that we are excluding the zero gamble from any
coherent set of desirable gambles, while Moral is including it.
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To prove coherence, it suffices to prove that DO avoids non-positivity, by Theorem 1.
But this is obvious because DO is a coherent set of desirable gambles on XO.
We are left to prove that margO(extN (DO)) = DO. Since for any g ∈ DO it is obvious
that both g ∈ extN (DO) and g ∈ G(XO), we see immediately that DO ⊆ margO(extN (DO)),
so we concentrate on proving the converse inclusion. Consider f ∈ margO(extN (DO)),
meaning that both f ∈ G(XO) and f ∈ extN (DO). The latter means that there are g ∈ DO,
h ∈ G(XN )>0, and non-negative λ and µ such that max{λ, µ} > 0 for which f = λg + µh.
Since we need to prove that f ∈ DO, we can assume without loss of generality that µ > 0.
But then h = (f −λg)/µ ∈ G(XO) and therefore also h ∈ G(XO)>0, whence indeed f ∈ DO,
by coherence of DO.
5. Conditioning
Suppose that we have a set DN ⊆ G(XN ) of desirable gambles modelling a subject’s infor-
mation about the uncertain variable XN .
Consider a subset I of N , and assume we want to update the model DN with the
information that XI = xI . This leads to an updated, or conditioned, set of desirable gambles:
DN |xI :=
{
f ∈ G(XN ) : f > 0 or I{xI}f ∈ DN
}
. (8)
For technical reasons, and mainly in order to streamline the proofs as much as possible, we
also allow the admittedly pathological case that I = ∅. Since I{x∅} = 1, this amounts to not
conditioning at all.
Eq. (8) introduces the conditioning operator ‘|’ essentially used by Walley (2000) and
Moral (2005). We prefer the slightly modified version ‘c’, introduced by De Cooman and
Quaeghebeur (2012). Since I{xI}f = I{xI}f(xI , ·), we can characterise the updated model
DN |xI through the set
DNcxI :=
{
g ∈ G(XN\I) : I{xI}g ∈ DN
} ⊆ G(XN\I),
in the specific sense that for all g ∈ G(XN\I):
g ∈ DNcxI ⇔ I{xI}g ∈ DN ⇔ I{xI}g ∈ DN |xI , (9)
and for all f ∈ G(XN ):
f ∈ DN |xI ⇔ (f > 0 or f(xI , ·) ∈ DNcxI).
As the above equation shows, there is a one-to-one correspondence between DN |xI and
DNcxI . We prefer this second operator because we find it more intuitive that conditioning
a gamble on some xI ∈ XI produces a gamble that depends only on the remaining N \ I
variables. This will be useful for instance when combining conditional sets of gambles, as
in Proposition 24 later on.
It is immediate to prove that conditioning preserves coherence:
Proposition 8. Let DN be a coherent set of desirable gambles on XN , and consider any
subset I of N . Then DNcxI is a coherent set of desirable gambles on XN\I .
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The order of marginalisation and conditioning can be reversed, under some conditions:
Proposition 9. Let DN be a coherent set of desirable gambles on XN , and consider any
disjoint subsets I and O of N . Then for all xI ∈ XI :
margO(DNcxI) = margI∪O(DN )cxI .
Proof. Consider any h ∈ G(XN ) and observe the following chain of equivalences:
h ∈ margO(DNcxI)⇔ h ∈ G(XO) and h ∈ DNcxI
⇔ h ∈ G(XO) and I{xI}h ∈ DN
⇔ h ∈ G(XO) and I{xI}h ∈ margI∪O(DN )
⇔ h ∈ G(XO) and h ∈ margI∪O(DN )cxI
⇔ h ∈ margI∪O(DN )cxI .
To end this section, let us briefly look at the consequences of this type of updating for
the coherent lower previsions associated with coherent sets of desirable gambles. This will
allow us to further back our claim that standard probability theory can be recovered as a
special case of the theory of coherent sets of desirable gambles, as it also allows us to derive
Bayes’s Rule.
Let us denote by PN the lower prevision induced by the joint model DN , and by P (·|xI)
the conditional lower prevision on G(XN\I) induced by the updated set DNcxI . Then for
any gamble g on XN\I :
P (g|xI) = sup {µ : g − µ ∈ DNcxI} = sup
{
µ : I{xI}[g − µ] ∈ DN
}
. (10)
This allows us to clarify further that sets of desirable gambles are indeed more informa-
tive than coherent lower previsions, again using the example by Moral (2005):
Example 2. Consider again the lower prevision P and the coherent sets of desirable gam-
bles D and D′ from Example 1. Consider the event that X1 = a, which has (upper) prob-
ability zero in both D and D′. When conditioning on this event, we obtain two different
updated sets: on the one hand,
Dc(X1 = a) = {g ∈ G(X2) : g > 0} = G(X2)>0
whereas
D′c(X1 = a) = {g ∈ G(X2) : g(a) + g(b) > 0} .
This means that there sets represent different information when conditioning on the event
of probability zero X1 = a. Indeed, if we apply Eq. (10) we see that the first one induces the
vacuous lower prevision P (g|X1 = a) = min{g(a), g(b)} for any gamble g on X2, while the
second one induces the uniform linear prevision: P (g|X1 = a) = g(a)+g(b)2 . 
The lower previsions PN and P (·|xI) then satisfy a condition called the Generalised
Bayes Rule (this follows from Williams, 1975b and Miranda & Zaffalon, 2010, Theorem 8):
PN (I{xI}[g − P (g|xI)]) = 0. (11)
13
De Cooman & Miranda
See Walley (1991, 2000) for more information about this rule. It leads to Bayes’s Rule in
the special case that the joint model DN induces a precise prevision PN . Indeed, if we
let g = I{xN\I} and generically denote probability mass by p, we infer from Eq. (11) and
the linearity of PN that PN (I{xI}I{xN\I}) = P (I{xN\I}|xI)PN (I{xI}), or in other words that
p(xN ) = p(xN\I |xI)p(xI). See Section 2.6 for more details on the relationship between
coherent lower (and linear) previsions and sets of desirable gambles.
Remark 1. A lower prevision P is also in a one-to-one correspondence with a so-called
set of almost desirable gambles, namely
D := {f : P (f) ≥ 0} .
This set corresponds to the uniform closure of any coherent set of desirable gambles D that
induces P by means of Eq. (2). Although sets of almost-desirable gambles are interesting,
and allow us work with non-strict preference relations (Walley, 1991, Section 3.7.6), we have
opted for considering the more general model of coherent sets of desirable gambles for two
(admittedly related) reasons. Like sets of strictly desirable gambles, sets of almost-desirable
gambles do not permit to elicit boundary behaviour, which may be important when updat-
ing, as we have discussed in Example 2. Moreover, conditioning a set of almost desirable
gambles may produce incoherent models when sets of probability zero are involved (Miranda
& Zaffalon, 2010, Proposition 5 and Example 2): if we take for instance X1 = X2 = {0, 1}
and the linear prevision P with mass function p(0, ·) = 0 and p(·, 1) = 12 , then its associated
set of almost desirable gambles is:
D = {f : f(1, 0) + f(1, 1) ≥ 0} ,
and if we use Eq. (8) to condition this set D on X1 = 0, we get G(X1,2), which is an
incoherent set. This means that for such sets of almost desirable gambles, and more generally
for sets of gambles associated with non-strict preferences, the conditioning operation must
be modified in order to avoid producing incoherences. It turns out there is no unique way
of doing this; see the work by Hermans (2012) for more details. 
6. Irrelevant natural extension
We are now ready to look at the simplest type of irrelevance judgement.
Definition 2. Consider two disjoint subsets I and O of N . We say that XI is epistemically
irrelevant to XO when learning the value of XI does not influence or change our subject’s
beliefs about XO.
When does a set DN of desirable gambles on XN capture this type of epistemic irrele-
vance? Observing that XI = xI turns DN into the updated set DNcxI of desirable gambles
on XN\I , we come to the following definition:
Definition 3. A set DN of desirable gambles on XN is said to satisfy epistemic irrelevance
of XI to XO when
margO(DNcxI) = margO(DN ) for all xI ∈ XI . (12)
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As before, for technical reasons we also allow I and O to be empty. It is clear from
the definition above that the ‘variable’ X∅, about whose constant value we are certain,
is epistemically irrelevant to any variable XO. Similarly, we see that any variable XI is
epistemically irrelevant to the ‘variable’ X∅. This seems to be in accordance with intuition.
We refer to Levi (1980), Walley (1982) and Walley (1991, Chapter 9) for related notions in
terms of coherent lower previsions or credal sets.
The epistemic irrelevance condition can be reformulated trivially in an interesting and
slightly different manner.
Proposition 10. Let DN be a coherent set of desirable gambles on XN , and let I and O
be any disjoint subsets of N . Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) margO(DNcxI) = margO(DN ) for all xI ∈ XI ;
(ii) for all f ∈ G(XO) and all xI ∈ XI : f ∈ DN ⇔ I{xI}f ∈ DN .
Proof. It suffices to take into account that f ∈ margO(DN ) if and only if f ∈ DN and
f ∈ G(XO), while f ∈ margO(DNcxI) if and only if f ∈ G(XO) and I{xI}f ∈ DN .
Irrelevance assessments are most useful in constructing sets of desirable gambles from
other ones. Suppose we have a coherent set DO of desirable gambles on XO, and an assess-
ment that XI is epistemically irrelevant to XO, where I and O are disjoint index sets. Then
how can we combine DO and this structural irrelevance assessment into a coherent set of
desirable gambles on XI∪O, or more generally, on XN , where N ⊇ I ∪ O? To see how this
can be done in a way that is as conservative as possible, we introduce the following sets
AirrI→O := posi
({
I{xI}g : g ∈ DO and xI ∈ XI
})
(13)
= {h ∈ G(XI∪O)6=0 : (∀xI ∈ XI)h(xI , ·) ∈ DO ∪ {0}} . (14)
Clearly, and this will be quite important in streamlining proofs, Airr∅→O = DO and AirrI→∅ =
G(XI)>0. The intuition behind Eq. (13) is to consider the cylindrical extensions of the
gambles in DO to the space XI∪O, and to take the natural extension of the resulting set.
The alternative expression (14) shows that this is equivalent to selecting a gamble in DO
for a finite number of xI in XI , and to derive from them a gamble on XI∪O.
Let us give two important properties of these sets:
Lemma 11. Consider disjoint subsets I and O of N , and a coherent set DO of desirable
gambles on XO. Then AirrI→O is a coherent set of desirable gambles on XI∪O.
Proof. D1. Assume ex absurdo that there are n > 0, real λk > 0 and fk ∈ AirrI→O such
that
∑n
k=1 λkfk = 0. It follows from the assumptions that there are ` ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
xI ∈ XI such that f`(xI , ·) 6= 0. This implies that in the sum
∑n
k=1 λkfk(xI , ·) = 0 not all
the gambles λkfk(xI , ·) are zero. Since the non-zero ones belong to DO, this contradicts the
coherence of DO.
D2. Consider any h ∈ G(XI∪O)>0. Then clearly h(xI , ·) ≥ 0 and therefore h(xI , ·) ∈
DO ∪ {0} for all xI ∈ XI . Since h 6= 0, it follows that indeed h ∈ AirrI→O.
D3. Trivial, using that posi(posi(D)) = posi(D) for any set of desirable gambles D.
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Lemma 12. Consider disjoint subsets I and O of N , and a coherent set DO of desirable
gambles on XO. Then margO(AirrI→O) = DO.
Proof. It is obvious from Eq. (14) that indeed:
margO(AirrI→O) = AirrI→O ∩ G(XO) = {h ∈ G(XO)6=0 : (∀xI ∈ XI)h ∈ DO ∪ {0}}
= {h ∈ G(XO) 6=0 : h ∈ DO ∪ {0}} = DO.
Theorem 13. Consider disjoint subsets I and O of N , and a coherent set DO of de-
sirable gambles on XO. Then the smallest coherent set of desirable gambles on XN that
marginalises to DO and satisfies the epistemic irrelevance condition (12) of XI to XO is
given by extN (AirrI→O) = posi(G(XN )>0 ∪ AirrI→O).
Proof. Consider any coherent set DN of desirable gambles on XN that marginalises to DO
and satisfies the irrelevance condition (12). This implies that margO(DNcxI) = DO for any
xI ∈ XI , so g ∈ DNcxI , and therefore I{xI}g ∈ DN for any g ∈ DO, by Eq. (9). So we infer
by coherence that AirrI→O ⊆ DN , and therefore also that posi(G(XN )>0 ∪ AirrI→O) ⊆ DN . As
a consequence, it suffices to prove that (i) extN (AirrI→O) is coherent, (ii) marginalises to DO,
and (iii) satisfies the epistemic irrelevance condition (12). This is what we now set out to
do.
(i). By Lemma 11, AirrI→O is a coherent set of desirable gambles on XI∪O, so Proposition 7
implies that posi(G(XN )>0 ∪ AirrI→O) = extN (AirrI→O) is a coherent set of desirable gambles
on XN .
(ii). Marginalisation leads to:
margO(extN (AirrI→O)) = margO(margI∪O(extN (AirrI→O))) = margO(AirrI→O) = DO,
where the first equality follows from Eq. (5), the second from Eq. (7), and the third from
Lemma 12.
(iii). It follows from Proposition 9 and Eq. (7) that
margO(extN (AirrI→O)cxI) = margI∪O(extN (AirrI→O))cxI = AirrI→OcxI ,
and we have just shown in (ii) that margO(extN (AirrI→O)) = DO, so proving the equality
margO(extN (AirrI→O)cxI) = margO(extN (AirrI→O)) amounts to proving that AirrI→OcxI = DO.
It is obvious from the definition of AirrI→O that DO ⊆ AirrI→OcxI , so we concentrate on the
converse inclusion. Consider any h ∈ AirrI→OcxI ; then I{xI}h ∈ AirrI→O, so we infer from
Eq. (14) that in particular h ∈ DO ∪{0}. But since AirrI→O is coherent by Lemma 11, we see
that h 6= 0 and therefore indeed h ∈ DO.
Theorem 13 is mentioned briefly, with only a hint at the proof, by Moral (2005, Section 2.4).
We believe the result is not so trivial and have therefore decided to include our version of
the proof here. Our notion of epistemic irrelevance is called weak epistemic irrelevance by
Moral. For his version of epistemic irrelevance he requires in addition that DN should be
equal to the irrelevant natural extension of DO, and therefore be the smallest model that
satisfies the (weak) epistemic irrelevance condition (12). While we feel comfortable with
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his reasons for doing so, we have decided not to follow his lead in this. Our main reason
for not doing so is tied up with the philosophy behind partial assessments (or probability
specifications). Each such assessment, be it local (e.g. stating that all gambles in some set
A are desirable) or structural (e.g. imposing symmetry or irrelevance), serves to further
restrict the possible models, and at each stage the most conservative (smallest possible)
model is considered to be the one to be used, and possibly further refined by additional
assessments. Only calling a model irrelevant when it is the smallest weakly irrelevant model
would, we believe, conflict with approach: larger models obtained later on by adding, say,
further symmetry assessments, would no longer deserve to be called irrelevant (but would
still satisfy all the relevant conditions).
We infer from Theorem 13 and Eq. (13) that extreme rays of the irrelevant natural
extension have the form I{xI}g, where g is some extreme ray of DO, so representing or
finding this extension on a computer has a computational complexity that is linear in the
number of extreme rays of DO and linear in the number of elements of the product set XI—
and therefore essentially exponential in the number |I| of irrelevant variables Xi, i ∈ I. More
generally, this will also be the case in the fairly general situation where DO is generated by
a finite number of so-called ‘generalised’ extreme rays, as described in detail in by Couso
and Moral (2011, Section 4) and Quaeghebeur (2012a, Section 3).
7. Independent natural extension
We now turn to independence assessments, which constitute a symmetrisation of irrelevance
assessments.
Definition 4. We say that the variables Xn, n ∈ N are epistemically independent when
learning the values of any number of them does not influence or change our beliefs about the
remaining ones: for any two disjoint subsets I and O of N , XI is epistemically irrelevant
to XO.
When does a set DN of desirable gambles on XN capture this type of epistemic inde-
pendence?
Definition 5. A coherent set DN of desirable gambles on XN is called independent if
margO(DNcxI) = margO(DN ) for all disjoint subsets I and O of N , and all xI ∈ XI .
In this definition, we allow I and O to be empty too, but doing so does not lead to any
substantive requirement, because the condition margO(DNcxI) = margO(DN ) is trivially
satisfied when I or O are empty.
Independent sets have an interesting factorisation property, which means that a product
of two desirable gambles that depend on different variables should again be desirable, pro-
vided one of the gambles is positive; see De Cooman et al. (2011) for another paper where
factorisation is considered in this somewhat unusual form. Factorisation follows from the
characterisation of epistemic irrelevance we have given in Proposition 10 and the properties
of coherence.
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Proposition 14 (Factorisation of independent sets). Let DN be an independent co-
herent set of desirable gambles on XN . Then for all disjoint subsets I and O of N and for
all f ∈ G(XO):
f ∈ DN ⇔ (∀g ∈ G(XI)>0)(fg ∈ DN ). (15)
Proof. Fix arbitrary disjoint subsets I and O of N and any f ∈ G(XO); we show that
Eq. (15) holds. The ‘⇐’ part is trivial. For the ‘⇒’ part, assume that f ∈ DN and consider
any g ∈ G(XI)>0. We have to show that fg ∈ DN . Since g =
∑
xI∈XI I{xI}g(xI), we see
that fg =
∑
xI∈XI g(xI)I{xI}f . Now since f ∈ margO(DN ), we infer from the independence
of DN and Proposition 10 that f ∈ DNcxI and therefore I{xI}f ∈ DN for all xI ∈ XI . We
conclude that fg is a positive linear combination of elements I{xI}f of DN , and therefore
belongs to DN by coherence.
Independence assessments are useful in constructing joint sets of desirable gambles from
marginal ones. Suppose we have coherent sets Dn of desirable gambles on Xn, for each n ∈ N
and an assessment that the variables Xn, n ∈ N are epistemically independent. Then how
can we combine the Dn and this structural independence assessment into a coherent set of
desirable gambles on XN in a way that is as conservative as possible? If we call independent
product of the Dn any independent DN ∈ D(XN ) that marginalises to the Dn for all n ∈ N ,
this means we are looking for the smallest such independent product.
Further on, we are going to prove that such a smallest independent product always exists.
Before we can do this elegantly, however, we need to do some preparatory work involving
particular sets of desirable gambles that can be constructed from the Dn. Consider, as a
special case of Eq. (14), for any subset I of N and any o ∈ N \ I:
AirrI→{o} := posi
({
I{xI}g : g ∈ Do and xI ∈ XI
})
(16)
=
{
h ∈ G(XI∪{o})6=0 : (∀xI ∈ XI)h(xI , ·) ∈ Do ∪ {0}
}
, (17)
and use these sets to construct the following set of gambles on XN :
⊗n∈NDn := posi
(
G(XN )>0 ∪
⋃
n∈N
AirrN\{n}→{n}
)
= posi
( ⋃
n∈N
AirrN\{n}→{n}
)
, (18)
where the second equality holds because the set G(XN )>0 is included inAirrN\{n}→{n} for every
n ∈ N . The set ⊗n∈NDn gathers the subsets of G(XN ) we can derive from the different Dn
by means of an assumption of epistemic irrelevance, and considers the natural extension of
their union, which is the minimal coherent superset (we shall show that it is indeed coherent
in Proposition 15 below). Observe that, quite trivially, Airr{n}\{n}→{n} = Dn and therefore
⊗m∈{n}Dm = Dn. We now prove a number of important properties for ⊗n∈NDn.
Proposition 15 (Coherence). Let Dn be coherent sets of desirable gambles on Xn, n ∈
N . Then ⊗n∈NDn is a coherent set of desirable gambles on XN .
Proof. Let, for ease of notation, AN :=
⋃
n∈N AirrN\{n}→{n}. It follows from Theorem 1
that we have to prove that AN avoids non-positivity. So consider any f ∈ posi(AN ), and
assume ex absurdo that f ≤ 0. Then there are λn ≥ 0 and fn ∈ AirrN\{n}→{n} such that
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f =
∑
n∈N λnfn and maxn∈N λn > 0 [recall that the AirrN\{n}→{n} are convex cones, by
Lemma 11]. Fix arbitrary m ∈ N . Let
ANm :=
{
fm(xN\{m}, ·) : xN\{m} ∈ XN\{m}, fm(xN\{m}, ·) 6= 0
}
,
then it follows from Eq. (17) that ANm is a finite non-empty subset of Dm, so the coherence
of Dm, Theorem 1 and Lemma 2 imply that there is some mass function pm on Xm with
expectation operator Em such that (∀xm ∈ Xm)pm(xm) > 0 and
(∀xN\{m} ∈ XN\{m})(fm(xN\{m}, ·) 6= 0⇒ Em(fm(xN\{m}, ·)) > 0).
So if we define the gamble gN\{m} on XN\{m} by letting
gN\{m}(xN\{m}) := Em(fm(xN\{m}, ·))
for all xN\{m} ∈ XN\{m}, then gN\{m} > 0.
Since we can do this for all m ∈ N , we can define the mass function pN on XN by letting
pN (xN ) :=
∏
m∈N pm(xm) > 0 for all xN ∈ XN . The corresponding expectation operator
EN is of course the product operator of the marginals Em. But then it follows from the
reasoning and assumptions above that EN (f) =
∑
m∈N λmEN (fm) =
∑
m∈N λmEN (gm) >
0, whereas f ≤ 0 leads us to conclude that EN (f) ≤ 0, a contradiction.
Lemma 16. Consider any disjoint subsets I, R and any o ∈ N \ (I ∪R). Then f(xR, ·) ∈
AirrI→{o} ∪ {0} for all f ∈ AirrI∪R→{o} and all xR ∈ XR.
Proof. Fix f ∈ AirrI∪R→{o} and xR ∈ XR and consider the gamble g := f(xR, ·) on XI∪{o}. It
follows from the assumptions that for all xI ∈ XI :
g(xI , ·) = f(xR, xI , ·) ∈ Do ∪ {0},
whence indeed g ∈ AirrI→{o} ∪ {0}.
Proposition 17 (Marginalisation). Consider coherent marginal sets of desirable gam-
bles Dn for all n ∈ N . Let R be any subset of N , then margR(⊗n∈NDn) = ⊗r∈RDr.
Proof. Since we are interpreting gambles on XR as special gambles on XN , it is clear from
Eq. (17) that for any r ∈ R, AirrR\{r}→{r} ⊆ AirrN\{r}→{r}. Eqs. (6) and (18) now tell us that
extN (⊗r∈RDr) ⊆ ⊗n∈NDn. If we invoke Eq. (7), this leads to
⊗r∈RDr = margR(extN (⊗r∈RDr)) ⊆ margR(⊗n∈NDn),
so we can concentrate on the converse inequality.
Consider therefore any f ∈ margR(⊗n∈NDn) = (⊗n∈NDn) ∩ G(XR), and assume ex
absurdo that f /∈ ⊗r∈RDr.
It follows from the coherence of ⊗n∈NDn that f 6= 0 [see Proposition 15]. Since f ∈
⊗n∈NDn, there are S ⊆ N , fs ∈ AirrN\{s}→{s}, s ∈ S and g ∈ G(XN ) with g ≥ 0 such that
f = g +
∑
s∈S fs. Clearly S \ R 6= ∅, because S \ R = ∅ would imply that, with xN\R any
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element of XN\R, f = f(xN\R, ·) = g(xN\R, ·) +
∑
s∈S∩R fs(xN\R, ·) ∈ ⊗r∈RDr, since we
infer from Lemma 16 that fs(xN\R, ·) ∈ AirrR\{s}→{s} ∪ {0} for all s ∈ S ∩R.
It follows from the coherence of ⊗r∈RDr [Proposition 15], f /∈ ⊗r∈RDr and Lemma 3
that 0 /∈ posi({−f} ∪ ⊗r∈RDr). Let, for ease of notation,
ANS∩R :=
{
fs(zN\R, ·) : s ∈ S ∩R, zN\R ∈ XN\R, fs(zN\R, ·) 6= 0
}
.
Then ANS∩R is clearly a finite subset of ⊗r∈RDr [to see this, use a similar argument as above,
involving Lemma 16], so we infer from Lemma 2 that there is some mass function pR on
XR with associated expectation operator ER such that
(∀xR ∈ XR)pR(xR) > 0
(∀s ∈ S ∩R)(∀zN\R ∈ XN\R)ER(fs(zN\R, ·)) ≥ 0
ER(f) < 0.
We then infer from f = f(zN\R, ·) = g(zN\R, ·) +
∑
s∈S∩R fs(zN\R, ·) +
∑
s∈S\R fs(zN\R, ·)
that for all zN\R in XN\R:
0 > ER(f)− ER(g(zN\R, ·))−
∑
s∈S∩R
ER(fs(zN\R, ·))
=
∑
s∈S\R
ER(fs(zN\R, ·)) =
∑
s∈S\R
∑
xR∈XR
pR(xR)fs(zN\R, xR).
The gambles fs(·, xR) on XN\R [where xR ∈ XR and s ∈ S \R] can clearly not all be zero.
The non-zero ones all belong to ⊗s∈N\RDs for all s ∈ N \R and all xR ∈ XR, by Lemma 16,
so the coherence of the set of desirable gambles ⊗s∈N\RDs [Proposition 15] guarantees
that their positive linear combination h :=
∑
s∈S\R
∑
xR∈XR pR(xR)fs(·, xR) also belongs to⊗s∈N\RDs. This contradicts h ≤ 0. Hence indeed f ∈ ⊗r∈RDr.
Proposition 18 (Conditioning). Consider coherent marginal sets of desirable gambles
Dn for all n ∈ N , and define ⊗n∈NDn by means of Eq. (18). Then ⊗n∈NDn is independent:
for all disjoint subsets I and O of N , and all xI ∈ XI ,
margO(⊗n∈NDncxI) = margO(⊗n∈NDn) = ⊗o∈ODo.
This could probably be proved indirectly using the ‘semi-graphoid’ properties of con-
ditional epistemic irrelevance, proved by Moral (2005); it appears we need reverse weak
union, reverse decomposition, and contraction. Here we give a direct proof. Proposition 17
can also be seen as a special case of the present result for I = ∅.
Proof. Fix arbitrary disjoint subsets I and O of N , and arbitrary xI ∈ XI . The second
equality follows from Proposition 17, so we concentrate on proving that margO(⊗n∈NDncxI)
coincides with ⊗o∈ODo. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 17.
We first show that ⊗o∈ODo ⊆ ⊗n∈NDncxI . Consider any gamble f ∈ ⊗o∈ODo, then we
have to show that I{xI}f ∈ ⊗n∈NDn. By assumption, there are non-negative reals λo and
µ, gambles fo ∈ AirrO\{o}→{o} for all o ∈ O and g ∈ G(XO)>0 such that f = µg +
∑
o∈O λofo
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and max{µ,maxo∈O λo} > 0. Fix o ∈ O and let f ′o := I{xI}fo ∈ G(XN ). Then it follows
from the definition of AirrO\{o}→{o} that f ′o(zN\{o}, ·) = I{xI}(zI)fo(zO\{o}, ·) ∈ Do∪{0} for all
zN\{o} ∈ XN\{o}. Since f ′o 6= 0, the definition of AirrN\{o}→{o} tells us that f ′o ∈ AirrN\{o}→{o}.
Similarly, if we let g′ := I{xI}g ∈ G(XN ), then g′ > 0. So it follows from Eq. (18) that
indeed I{xI}f = µg
′ +
∑
o∈O λof
′
o ∈ ⊗n∈NDn.
We now turn to the converse inclusion, ⊗n∈NDncxI ⊆ ⊗o∈ODo. Consider any gamble
f ∈ G(XO) such that I{xI}f belongs to ⊗n∈NDn and assume ex absurdo that f /∈ ⊗o∈ODo.
Let, for the sake of notational simplicity, C := N \ (I ∪O).
It follows from the coherence of ⊗n∈NDn that f 6= 0 [see Proposition 15]. Since I{xI}f ∈
⊗n∈NDn, there are S ⊆ N , fs ∈ AirrN\{s}→{s}, s ∈ S and g ∈ G(XN ) with g ≥ 0 such that
I{xI}f = g+
∑
s∈S fs. Clearly S \O 6= ∅, because S \O = ∅ would imply that, with xC any
element of XC , f = g(xI , xC , ·) +
∑
s∈S∩O fs(xI , xC , ·) ∈ ⊗o∈ODo, since Lemma 16 shows
that fs(xI , xC , ·) ∈ AirrO\{s}→{s} for all s ∈ S ∩O.
It follows from the coherence of ⊗o∈ODo [Proposition 15], f /∈ ⊗o∈ODo and Lemma 3
that 0 /∈ posi({−f} ∪ ⊗o∈ODo). Let, for ease of notation,
ANS∩O := {fs(xI , zC , ·) : s ∈ S ∩O, zC ∈ XC , fs(xI , zC , ·) 6= 0} .
Then ANS∩O is clearly a finite subset of ⊗o∈ODo [to see this, use a similar argument as above,
involving Lemma 16], so we infer from Lemma 2 that there is some mass function pO on
XO with associated expectation operator EO such that
(∀xO ∈ XO)pO(xO) > 0
(∀s ∈ S ∩O)(∀zC ∈ XC)EO(fs(xI , zC , ·)) ≥ 0
EO(f) < 0.
Since f = g(xI , zC , ·)+
∑
s∈S∩O fs(xI , zC , ·)+
∑
s∈S\O fs(xI , zC , ·) for any choice of zC ∈ XC ,
we see that:
0 > EO(f)− EO(g(xI , zC , ·))−
∑
s∈S∩O
EO(fs(xI , zC , ·))
=
∑
s∈S\O
EO(fs(xI , zC , ·)) =
∑
s∈S\O
∑
xO∈XO
pO(xO)fs(xI , zC , xO)).
Similarly, for any zC ∈ XC and any zI ∈ XI \ {xI} we then infer from 0 = g(zI , zC , ·) +∑
s∈S∩O fs(zI , zC , ·) +
∑
s∈S\O fs(zI , zC , ·) that:
0 ≥ −EO(g(zI , zC , ·))−
∑
s∈S∩O
EO(fs(zI , zC , ·))
=
∑
s∈S\O
EO(fs(zI , zC , ·)) =
∑
s∈S\O
∑
xO∈XO
pO(xO)fs(zI , zC , xO)).
Hence
h :=
∑
s∈S\O
∑
xO∈XO
pO(xO)fs(·, ·, xO) ≤ 0.
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The gambles fs(·, ·, xO) on XI∪C [where xO ∈ XO and s ∈ S \ O] can clearly not all be
zero. The non-zero ones all belong to ⊗s∈I∪CDs, by Lemma 16. But then the coherence of
the set of desirable gambles ⊗s∈I∪CDs [Proposition 15] guarantees that their positive linear
combination h is an element of ⊗c∈CDc for which h ≤ 0, a contradiction. Hence indeed
f ∈ ⊗o∈ODo.
Theorem 19 (Independent natural extension). Consider the coherent sets Dn of de-
sirable gambles on Xn, n ∈ N . Then ⊗n∈NDn is the smallest coherent set of desirable
gambles on XN that is an independent product of the coherent sets of desirable gambles Dn,
n ∈ N .
We call ⊗n∈NDn the independent natural extension of the marginals Dn.
Proof. It follows from Propositions 15, 17 and 18 that ⊗n∈NDn is an independent product
DN of the Dn. To prove that it is the smallest one, consider any independent product DN of
the Dn. Fix n ∈ N . If we consider any xN\{n} ∈ XN\{n}, then margn(DNcxN\{n}) = Dn, by
assumption. If we therefore consider any g ∈ Dn, this in turn implies that g ∈ DNcxN\{n},
and therefore I{xN\{n}}g ∈ DN , by Eq. (9). So we infer by coherence that AirrN\{n}→{n} ⊆ DN ,
and therefore also that ⊗n∈NDn ⊆ DN .
One of the most useful properties of the independent natural extension, is its associa-
tivity: it allows us to construct the extension in a modular fashion.
Theorem 20 (Associativity of independent natural extension). Let N1 and N2 be
disjoint non-empty index sets, and consider Dnk ∈ D(Xnk), nk ∈ Nk, k = 1, 2. Then given
DN1 := ⊗n1∈N1Dn1 and DN2 := ⊗n2∈N2Dn2, it holds that
DN1 ⊗DN2 = ⊗n∈N1∪N2Dn.
Proof. We first prove that DN1 ⊗ DN2 ⊆ ⊗n∈N1∪N2Dn. Fix any gamble h ∈ Airr{N1}→{N2}
and any xN1 ∈ XN1 , so h(xN1 , ·) ∈ DN2 ∪ {0} by Eq. (17). It follows from Eq. (18) that
there are gambles hn2xN1
∈ AirrN2\{n2}→{n2} ∪ {0} for all n2 ∈ N2 such that
h(xN1 , ·) ≥
∑
n2∈N2
hn2xN1
.
Define, for any n2 ∈ N2, the gamble gn2 on XN by letting gn2(xN\{n2}, ·) := hn2xN1 (xN2\{n2}, ·)
for all xN ∈ XN . Then it follows from Eq. (17) that gn2(xN\{n2}, ·) ∈ Dn2 ∪ {0} for all
xN ∈ XN , and therefore gn2 ∈ AirrN\{n2}→{n2} ∪ {0}. Moreover,
h =
∑
xN1∈XN1
I{xN1}h(xN1 , ·)
≥
∑
xN1∈XN1
I{xN1}
∑
n2∈N2
hn2xN1
=
∑
n2∈N2
∑
xN1∈XN1
I{xN1}h
n2
xN1
=
∑
n2∈N2
gn2 ,
It therefore follows from Eq. (18) that h ∈ ⊗n∈N1∪N2Dn, since clearly h 6= 0 because of
Eq. (17). We conclude that Airr{N1}→{N2} ⊆ ⊗n∈N1∪N2Dn. Similarly, we can prove the
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inclusion Airr{N2}→{N1} ⊆ ⊗n∈N1∪N2Dn, and therefore also DN1 ⊗DN2 ⊆ ⊗n∈N1∪N2Dn, again
by Eq. (18).
Next, we prove the converse inclusion ⊗n∈N1∪N2Dn ⊆ DN1 ⊗DN2 . Consider any gamble
h ∈ ⊗n∈N1∪N2Dn, then by Eq. (18) there are hn ∈ AirrN1∪N2\{n}→{n}∪{0} for all n ∈ N1∪N2
such that
h ≥
∑
n∈N
hn = h1 + h2, where h1 :=
∑
n1∈N1
hn1 and h2 :=
∑
n2∈N2
hn2 .
Fix any xN1 ∈ XN1 . For any n2 ∈ N2, hn2 ∈ AirrN1∪N2\{n2}→{n2} ∪ {0} implies that
hn2(xN1 , ·) ∈ AirrN2\{n2}→{n2} ∪{0} by Lemma 16. Hence h2(xN1 , ·) ∈ DN2 ∪{0} by Eq. (18),
and therefore h2 ∈ Airr{N1}→{N2} ∪ {0} by Eq. (17). Similarly, h1 ∈ Airr{N2}→{N1} ∪ {0}, and
therefore h ∈ DN1 ⊗DN2 by Eq. (18), since clearly h 6= 0.
To conclude this section, we establish a connection between independent natural exten-
sion for sets of desirable gambles and the eponymous notion for coherent lower previsions,
studied in detail by De Cooman et al. (2011). Given coherent lower previsions Pn on G(Xn),
n ∈ N , their independent natural extension is the coherent lower prevision given by
EN (f) := sup
hn∈G(XN )
n∈N
min
zN∈XN
[
f(zN )−
∑
n∈N
[hn(zN )− Pn(hn(·, zN\{n}))]
]
(19)
for all gambles f on XN . It is the point-wise smallest (most conservative) joint lower
prevision that satisfies the property of coherence by Walley (1991, Chapter 7) with the
marginals Pn given an assessment of epistemic independence of the variables Xn, n ∈ N .
The correspondence between coherent lower previsions and sets of desirable gambles has
been mentioned in Section 2.6; we show next that if we have such a correspondence between
the marginals, it also holds between their associated independent natural extensions.
Theorem 21. Let Dn be coherent sets of desirable gambles on Xn for n ∈ N , and let
⊗n∈NDn be their independent natural extension. Consider the coherent lower previsions
Pn on G(Xn) given by Pn(fn) := sup {µ ∈ R : fn − µ ∈ Dn} for all fn ∈ G(Xn). Then the
independent natural extension EN of the marginal lower previsions Pn, n ∈ N satisfies
EN (f) = sup {µ ∈ R : f − µ ∈ ⊗n∈NDn} for all f ∈ G(XN ).
Proof. Fix any gamble f in G(XN ). First, consider any real number µ < EN (f), then
it follows from Eq. (19) that there are δ > 0 and hn ∈ G(XN ), n ∈ N such that f − µ ≥∑
n∈N gn, where we defined the gambles gn on XN by gn(zN ) := hn(zN )−Pn(hn(zN\{n}, ·))+
δ for all zN ∈ XN . But it follows from the definition of Pn that
gn(zN\{n}, ·) = hn(zN\{n}, ·)− Pn(hn(zN\{n}, ·)) + δ ∈ Dn for all zN\{n} ∈ XN\{n}.
Since clearly gn 6= 0, Eq. (17) then tells us that gn ∈ AirrN\{n}→{n}, and we infer from
Eq. (18) that
∑
n∈N gn ∈ ⊗n∈NDn, and therefore also f − µ ∈ ⊗n∈NDn. This guarantees
that EN (f) ≤ sup {µ ∈ R : f − µ ∈ ⊗n∈NDn}.
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To prove the converse inequality, consider any real number µ such that f−µ ∈ ⊗n∈NDn.
We infer using Eq. (18) that there are gambles hn ∈ AirrN\{n}→{n}, n ∈ N such that f − µ ≥∑
n∈N hn. For all n ∈ N and zN\{n} ∈ XN\{n}, it follows from Eq. (17) that hn(zN\{n}, ·) ∈
Dn ∪ {0}, and therefore Pn(hn(zN\{n}, ·)) ≥ 0, whence∑
n∈N
[
hn(zN )− Pn(hn(zN\{n}, ·))
] ≤∑
n∈N
hn(zN ) ≤ f(zN )− µ.
We then infer from Eq. (19) that EN (f) ≥ µ and so we find that indeed also EN (f) ≥
sup {µ ∈ R : f − µ ∈ ⊗n∈NDn}.
In a similar way as for the irrelevant natural extension, we infer from Eqs. (16) and (18)
that the computational complexity of finding or representing the independent natural ex-
tension of a number of marginal models Dn is linear in the number of extreme rays of the
Dn, and linear in the number of elements of the sets XN\{n}—and therefore essentially ex-
ponential in the number |N | of independent variables Xn, n ∈ N . Similar results will hold
in the more general case that the marginal sets of desirable gambles can be characterised
using a finite number of ‘generalised’ extreme rays, as described by Couso and Moral (2011)
and Quaeghebeur (2012a).
8. Maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles and strong products
We have seen that for any collection Dn, n ∈ N of marginal coherent sets of desirable gam-
bles, there always is a smallest independent product, which we have called the independent
natural extension ⊗n∈NDn. We have proceeded in this way because we had no way of
excluding that there may be other, larger, independent products. Indeed, we show in this
section that such is the case. Using the notions of independent natural extension and max-
imal coherent sets of desirable gambles, we can consistently define a specific independent
product that typically strictly includes the independent natural extension. We call it the
strong product, because it is very close in spirit to the strong product used in coherent lower
prevision theory (Couso, Moral, & Walley, 2000; Cozman, 2000, 2005; De Cooman et al.,
2011), as we shall see in Theorem 28.
8.1 Independent products of maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles
We begin by mentioning a number of interesting facts about maximal coherent sets of desir-
able gambles, and their independent products. The following result was already (essentially)
proved by Couso and Moral (2011): updating a coherent set of desirable gambles preserves
its maximality.
Proposition 22. Let MN ∈ M(XN ), and consider any disjoint subsets I and O of N .
Then margO(MNcxI) ∈M(XO) for all xI ∈ XI .
Proof. Suppose there is some xI in XI for which margO(MNcxI) is not maximal. This
means that there is some f ∈ G(XO) for which neither f nor −f belong to MNcxI , which
in turn implies that neither I{xI}f nor −I{xI}f belong to MN . But this contradicts the
maximality of MN .
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On the other hand, taking the independent natural extension does not necessarily pre-
serve maximality: if Mn ∈ M(Xn) for all n ∈ N , then it does not necessarily hold that
⊗n∈NMn ∈M(XN ), as the counterexample in Section A.1 shows. Interestingly, that exam-
ple does not present an isolated case: when we consider two binary variables, the indepen-
dent natural extension of two maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles is never maximal,
as we can see in our next proposition. It is an open problem whether this negative result
can be extended to any finite set of (not necessarily binary) variables.
An intuitive explanation of this result is that each of the maximal sets of gambles is a
half-space where we are excluding one of the two rays determining its boundary, so as not
to have the zero gamble as desirable; and when we apply the notion of independent natural
extension we end up missing three of the four parts of the boundary of the set of gambles
in the product space, preventing this product from being maximal.
Proposition 23. Consider X1 = X2 = {0, 1}, and let M1 and M2 be any maximal coher-
ent sets of desirable gambles on X1 and X2, respectively. Then their independent natural
extension M1 ⊗M2 is not a maximal coherent set of desirable gambles.
Proof. Let pk be the mass function of the linear prevision Pk determined by Mk, k = 1, 2.
We deduce from Theorem 21 that the lower prevision determined by M1 ⊗M2 is the in-
dependent natural extension of the linear previsions P1 and P2, and therefore equal to the
independent product P{1,2} of these linear previsions [see Proposition 25 in De Cooman
et al., 2011]. This is the linear prevision on G(X{1,2}) with mass function defined by
p{1,2}(x1, x2) := p1(x1)p2(x2) for all (x1, x2) ∈ X{1,2}.
Before we really get the proof on the tracks, we make a useful observation. Any maximal
Mk is a semi-plane through the origin that excludes the origin, includes its boundary on
one side of the origin, and excludes the boundary on the other side. This means that
there is unique element ak of Xk where all the elements fk of the included boundary—those
elements fk of Mk for which Pk(fk) is zero—are positive fk(ak) > 0. We denote the single
other element of Xk by bk. In other words, if we express
Mk = {fk : Pk(fk) > 0} ∪ {fk : Pk(fk) = 0, fk ∈Mk},
and consider fk ∈ Mk with Pk(fk) = pk(ak)fk(ak) + pk(bk)fk(bk) = 0, then if fk(ak) > 0
there cannot be any gk ∈ Mk with Pk(gk) = 0 and gk(bk) > 0: otherwise, the zero gamble
would be a convex combination of fk and gk [it would be 0 = fk− fk(bk)gk(bk)gk] and it would thus
belong to Mk, a contradiction with its coherence. Note that in this reasoning we assume
implicitly that pk(ak) ∈ (0, 1); otherwise, if for instance pk(ak) = 0, a gamble fk satisfies
Pk(fk) = 0 if and only if fk(bk) = 0, and then fk can only belong to Mk if fk(ak) > 0.
We are now ready to turn to the proof. There are a number of possibilities.
First, assume that both pk(ak) > 0 and pk(bk) > 0 for k = 1, 2. Consider any gamble h
on X{1,2} such that h(a1, a2) = h(b1, b2) = 0, minh < 0, maxh > 0 and
P{1,2}(h) = p1(a1)p2(b2)h(a1, b2) + p1(b1)p2(a2)h(b1, a2) = 0.
Of course, there always is such a gamble, and we are going to show that it does not belong
to M1 ⊗M2.
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Assume ex absurdo that it does, meaning that there are h1 ∈ Airr{2}→{1} and h2 ∈
Airr{1}→{2} such that h ≥ h1 + h2. By definition, h1(·, x2) ∈ M1 ∪ {0} and therefore
P1(h1(·, x2)) ≥ 0 for all x2 ∈ X2. Similarly, P2(h2(x1, ·)) ≥ 0 for all x1 ∈ X1. Hence
0 = P{1,2}(h) ≥ P{1,2}(h1) + P{1,2}(h2) ≥ 0, taking into account that
P{1,2}(h1) =
∑
x2∈X2
p2(x2)P1(h1(·, x2)) ≥ 0 and P{1,2}(h2) =
∑
x1∈X1
p1(x1)P2(h2(x1, ·)) ≥ 0.
As a consequence, P{1,2}(h1) = P{1,2}(h2) = 0. But this in turn implies that P1(h1(·, x2)) =
0 for all x2 ∈ X2 and that P2(h2(x1, ·)) = 0 for all x1 ∈ X1. Given the observations
made at the start of the proof, we therefore come to the conclusion that h1(a1, x2) ≥ 0
for all x2 ∈ X2 and h2(x1, a2) ≥ 0 for all x1 ∈ X1. But then h(a1, a2) = 0 implies
that h1(a1, a2) = h2(a1, a2) = 0, which in turn implies that h1(b1, a2) = h2(a1, b2) = 0,
because both 0 = P1(h1(·, a2)) = p1(a1)h1(a1, a2) + p1(b1)h1(b1, a2) and 0 = P2(h2(a1, ·)) =
p2(a1)h1(a1, a2) + p2(b1)h1(a1, b2). So we eventually find that
h(b1, a2) ≥ h1(b1, a2) + h2(b1, a2) ≥ 0 and h(a1, b2) ≥ h1(a1, b2) + h2(a1, b2) ≥ 0,
which contradicts minh < 0.
Now, if any non-zero h such that h(a1, a2) = h(b1, b2) = 0 = P{1,2}(h) with minh < 0
and maxh > 0 does not belong toM1⊗M2, neither does −h, and this means thatM1⊗M2
is not maximal.
Next we consider the cases where one of the marginal linear previsions are degenerate.
Assume for instance that p1(a1) = 0 and p2(a2) ∈ (0, 1) [the other cases where only one of
the marginals is degenerate are similar]. Consider a non-zero gamble h2 /∈ M2 such that
P2(h2) = 0 [always possible]. Then −h2 ∈ M2 and it follows from the observations made
in the beginning of this proof that h2(a2) < 0. Now consider the gamble h defined by
h(b1, a2) := h2(a2) < 0, h(b1, b2) := h2(b2) ≥ 0, h(a1, a2) = h(a1, a2) := 1.
It follows that P{1,2}(h) = P2(h2) = 0. To see that h /∈ M1 ⊗M2, assume that there
are f1 ∈ Airr{2}→{1} and f2 ∈ Airr{1}→{2} such that h ≥ f1 + f2. But then 0 = P{1,2}(h) ≥
P{1,2}(f1) +P{1,2}(f2) ≥ 0 and therefore 0 = P{1,2}(f1) = p2(a2)f1(b1, a2) + p2(b2)f1(b1, b2).
On the other hand, f1 ∈ Airr{2}→{1} also implies that P1(f1(·, x2)) ≥ 0 for all x2 ∈ X2, and
therefore f1(b1, a2) ≥ 0 and f1(b1, b2) ≥ 0. Hence f1(b1, ·) = 0, and therefore f2(b1, ·) ≤
h(b1, ·) = h2 and since h2 /∈ M2, it follows that f2(b1, ·) /∈ M2. Because we must have by
definition that f2(b1, ·) ∈ M2 ∪ {0}, this can only mean that f2(b1, ·) = 0, whence h2 ≥ 0,
contradicting h2(a2) < 0. This implies that h cannot belong to M1 ⊗M2.
Similarly, if −h belongs to M1 ⊗ M2, then there must be g1 ∈ Airr{2}→{1} and g2 ∈
Airr{1}→{2} such that −h ≥ g1 + g2. But then 0 = P{1,2}(−h) ≥ P{1,2}(g1) + P{1,2}(g2) ≥
0, whence 0 = P{1,2}(g1) = p2(a2)g1(b1, a2) + p2(b2)g1(b1, b2). But g1 ∈ Airr{2}→{1} also
implies that P1(g1(·, x2)) ≥ 0 for all x2 ∈ X2, and therefore g1(b1, a2) ≥ 0 and g1(b1, b2) ≥
0. Hence g1(b1, ·) = 0, and therefore we find that g1(a1, a2) ≥ 0 and g1(a1, b2) ≥ 0 [if,
say, g1(a1, a2) < 0 then g1(·, a2) < 0 because also g1(b1, a2) = 0, which contradicts that
g1(·, a2) ∈ M1 ∪ {0}, a consequence of g1 ∈ Airr{2}→{1}]. Since, moreover, g2 ∈ Airr{1}→{2}
implies that 0 ≤ P2(g2(a1, ·)) = p2(a2)g2(a1, a2) + p2(b2)g2(a1, b2) and therefore also that
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g2(a1, a2) ≥ 0 or g2(a1, b2) ≥ 0, it follows that −h(a1, a2) ≥ 0 or −h(a1, b2) ≥ 0, which
contradicts −h(a1, a2) = −h(a1, b2) = −1 < 0. Hence, −h does not belong to M1 ⊗M2
either, so M1 ⊗M2 is not maximal.
Finally, we turn to the cases where all marginals are degenerate. Assume for instance
that p1(a1) = p2(a2) = 0 [the other cases where both marginals are degenerate, are similar].
Consider the gamble h given by
h(a1, a2) = h(b1, b2) = 0, h(b1, a2) = 1, h(a1, b2) = −1,
then P{1,2}(h) = p1(b1)p2(b2)h(b1, b2) = 0. To see that h /∈ M1 ⊗M2, assume ex absurdo
that there are u1 ∈ Airr{2}→{1} and u2 ∈ Airr{1}→{2} such that h ≥ u1+u2. Then u1 ∈ Airr{2}→{1}
implies that
u1(b1, b2) = P1(u1(·, b2)) ≥ 0 and u1(b1, a2) = P1(u1(·, a2)) ≥ 0,
and similarly u2 ∈ Airr{1}→{2} implies that u2(b1, b2) = P2(u2(b1, ·)) ≥ 0 and u2(a1, b2) =
P2(u2(a1, ·)) ≥ 0. Now it also follows from P{1,2}(h) = 0, P{1,2}(u1) ≥ 0 and P{1,2}(u2) ≥ 0
that u1(b1, b2) = P{1,2}(u1) = 0 and u2(b1, b2) = P{1,2}(u2) = 0, and as a consequence we
find that u1(a1, b2) ≥ 0 and u2(b1, a2) ≥ 0 [if, say, u1(a1, b2) < 0 then u1(·, b2) < 0 because
also u1(b1, b2) = 0, which contradicts u1(·, b2) ∈M1∪{0}, a consequence of u1 ∈ Airr{2}→{1}].
As a consequence, −1 = h(a1, b2) ≥ u1(a1, b2) + u2(a1, b2) ≥ 0, a contradiction. Hence
indeed, h does not belong to M1 ⊗M2.
Finally, assume ex absurdo that there are v1 ∈ Airr{2}→{1} and v2 ∈ Airr{1}→{2} such that
−h ≥ v1 + v2. Then v1 ∈ Airr{2}→{1} implies that
v1(b1, b2) = P1(v1(·, b2)) ≥ 0 and v1(b1, a2) = P1(v1(·, a2)) ≥ 0,
and similarly v2 ∈ Airr{1}→{2} implies that v2(b1, b2) = P2(v2(b1, ·)) ≥ 0 and v2(a1, b2) =
P2(v2(a1, ·)) ≥ 0. Now it also follows from P{1,2}(−h) = 0, P{1,2}(v1) ≥ 0 and P{1,2}(v1) ≥ 0
that v1(b1, b2) = P{1,2}(v1) = 0 and v2(b1, b2) = P{1,2}(v2) = 0, and as a consequence we find
that v1(a1, b2) ≥ 0 and v2(b1, a2) ≥ 0 [if, say, v1(a1, b2) < 0 then v1(·, b2) < 0 because also
v1(b1, b2) = 0, which contradicts v1(·, b2) ∈ M1 ∪ {0}, a consequence of v1 ∈ Airr{2}→{1}]. As
a consequence, −1 = −h(b1, a2) ≥ v1(b1, a2) + v2(b1, a2) ≥ 0, a contradiction. This shows
that −h does not belong to M1 ⊗M2 either, and therefore this set is not maximal.
On the other hand, the Example A.2 in the Appendix shows that there are independent
products of maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles that are maximal; hence, the inde-
pendent natural extension of maximal coherent sets is not their only independent product.
Indeed, we can establish the following result:
Proposition 24. Consider maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles M1 ∈ M(X1) and
M2 ∈M(X2).
(i) Let D{1,2} be any coherent set of desirable gambles on X{1,2} such that M1 ⊗M2 ⊆
D{1,2}. Then D{1,2} is independent with marginals M1 and M2.
(ii) As a consequence, a maximal set of gambles M{1,2} is an independent product of its
marginals if and only if M{1,2}cx2 is the same for all x2 ∈ X2 and M{1,2}cx1 is the
same for all x1 ∈ X1.
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Proof. (i). We have for every x1 ∈ X1 that M2 = (M1 ⊗M2)cx1 ⊆ D{1,2}cx1, where
the equality follows from Proposition 18. Since M2 is maximal, this implies that M2 =
D{1,2}cx1 for all x1 ∈ X1, and a similar argument shows that M1 = D{1,2}cx2 for all
x2 ∈ X2. On the other hand, it follows from Proposition 17 thatM2 = marg2(M1⊗M2) ⊆
marg2(D{1,2}). Since M2 is maximal, this implies that M2 = marg2(D{1,2}), and a similar
argument shows that M1 = marg1(D{1,2}). In summary, we see that marg1(D{1,2}) =
D{1,2}cx2 for all x2 ∈ X2, and marg2(D{1,2}) = D{1,2}cx1 for all x1 ∈ X1, showing that
D{1,2} is indeed independent.
(ii). It follows from the definition of an independent product that it is necessary that
M{1,2}cx2 and M{1,2}cx1 should be the same for all x2 and x1, respectively. To see that
this is also a sufficient condition for M{1,2} to be an independent product, note that in
that caseM{1,2}cx1⊗M{1,2}cx2 ⊆M{1,2}, and that the setsM{1,2}cx1 andM{1,2}cx2 are
maximal, by Proposition 22. On the other hand, Proposition 17 implies that
marg1(M{1,2}cx1 ⊗M{1,2}cx2) =M{1,2}cx1 ⊆ marg1(M{1,2}),
so both sets are equal. Similarly, we deduce that
marg2(M{1,2}cx1 ⊗M{1,2}cx2) =M{1,2}cx2 ⊆ marg2(M{1,2}),
and therefore marg1(M{1,2}) ⊗ marg2(M{1,2}) ⊆ M{1,2}. Invoking the first part of the
proposition, we find that M{1,2} is an independent product of its marginals.
The first part of this proposition provides us with a simple characterisation of the
independent products of two maximal sets: they are simply those coherent supersets of
the independent natural extension; in particular, this means that any maximal superset of
this independent natural extension will be an independent product, so two maximal sets
always have maximal products (although these will differ from the independent natural
extension). The second part implies that if the sets of conditional gambles coincide for all
the conditioning events, then they automatically agree with the marginal sets of gambles,
and as a consequence the set is an independent product.
8.2 The strong product and its properties
Now consider the case where we have coherent marginal sets of desirable gambles Dn for
all n ∈ N . We define their strong product n∈NDn as the set of desirable gambles on the
product space XN given by:8
n∈NDn :=
⋂
{⊗n∈NMn : Mn ∈ m(Dn), n ∈ N} ,
where m(Dn) is given by Eq. (1). This strong product corresponds is the set of desirable
gambles determined by a notion of independence that is more restrictive than those of epis-
temic irrelevance and independence considered so far: that of strong independence (Couso
et al., 2000; Cozman, 2012), sometimes called type-3 independence (de Campos & Moral,
8. As this paper focusses on independent natural extension, because that has a much more direct behavioural
justification, we will forgo discussing the complexity of computing this strong product, which, on the
face of it, appears to be significantly higher than that for independent natural extension.
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1995). Strong independence means that the associated joint credal set is the convex hull of
the set of linear previsions that are the stochastic independent products of linear previsions
that dominate the marginals; or, equivalently, that the associated lower prevision is the
lower envelope of the products of the linear previsions that dominate the marginals. This
will be clearer after Theorem 28.
For maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles Mn ∈ M(Xn), n ∈ N the strong prod-
uct and the independent natural extension coincide: n∈NMn = ⊗n∈NMn, as clearly
m(Mn) = {Mn}. Taking into account Proposition 23, we deduce that the strong product
of maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles is not necessarily maximal; Example A.2 in
the Appendix shows that there are other independent products that may strictly include
the strong product.
The marginalisation properties of the strong product follow directly from those of the
independent natural extension.
Proposition 25 (Marginalisation). Consider coherent sets of desirable gambles Dn for
all n ∈ N . Let R be any subset of N , then margR(n∈NDn) = r∈RDr.
Proof. Consider any f ∈ G(XR) and observe the following chain of equivalences:
f ∈ n∈NDn ⇔ (∀Mn ∈ m(Dn), n ∈ N)f ∈ ⊗n∈NMn
⇔ (∀Mn ∈ m(Dn), n ∈ N)f ∈ ⊗r∈RMr
⇔ (∀Mr ∈ m(Dr), r ∈ R)f ∈ ⊗r∈RMr
⇔ f ∈ r∈RDr,
where the second equivalence follows from Proposition 17.
Next, we show that the strong product of some coherent marginal sets of desirable gambles
Dn is an independent product of these marginals. In order to do so, we first establish the
following simple yet powerful result:
Proposition 26. Let DjN , j ∈ J be any non-empty family of independent coherent sets
of desirable gambles on XN . Then their intersection DN :=
⋂
j∈J DjN is an independent
coherent set of desirable gambles on XN .
Proof. Consider any disjoint subsets I and O of N , and any xI ∈ XI . Then
h ∈ margO(DNcxI)⇔ (∀j ∈ J)h ∈ margO(DjNcxI)
⇔ (∀j ∈ J)h ∈ margO(DjN )
⇔ h ∈ margO(DN ).
Proposition 27. Consider coherent marginal sets of desirable gambles Dn for all n ∈ N .
Then their strong product n∈NDn is an independent product of these marginals.
Proof. Taking into account Proposition 26, all we need to show is that the sets Dn are the
marginals of the strong product n∈NDn. This is an immediate consequence of Proposi-
tion 25.
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The strong product may strictly include the independent natural extension, as we can
see from the example in Section A.3. It is an open question whether, like the indepen-
dent natural extension, the strong product is associative. Although we have not been
able to prove associativity in general, it is not difficult to show that it suffices to es-
tablish it for maximal sets of desirable gambles, and that one of the inclusions, namely
n∈N1∪N2Mn ⊆ (n∈N1Mn)  (n∈N2Mn) holds because the strong product always in-
cludes the independent natural extension. We suspect, but have not been able to prove,
that the converse inclusion also holds, and that the strong product is associative, taking into
account that in its definition we are taking the intersection of sets of gambles determined
by an associative operator (the independent natural extension).
To conclude this section, we establish a connection between the strong product of sets
of desirable gambles and the eponymous notion for coherent lower previsions, studied for
instance by De Cooman et al. (2011) (see also Cozman, 2012 for comments on the corre-
sponding notion in terms of credal sets, which is sometimes called the strong extension).
Given coherent lower previsions Pn on G(Xn), n ∈ N , their strong product is the coherent
lower prevision defined by
SN (f) := inf {×n∈NPn(f) : (∀n ∈ N)Pn ∈M(Pn)}
for all gambles f on XN ; the intuition behind this notion, taking into account the cor-
respondence between coherent lower previsions and sets of desirable gambles discussed in
Section 2.6, is that the intersection of a family of sets of desirable gambles is closely related
to taking the lower envelope of the associated family of coherent lower previsions.
If we start from linear previsions Pn on G(Xn), their strong product corresponds to their
linear product ×n∈NPn, and it coincides also with their independent natural extension EN .
If we begin with coherent lower previsions Pn on G(Xn), their strong product SN is the
lower envelope of the set of strong products determined by the dominating linear previsions.
Theorem 28. Let Dn be coherent sets of desirable gambles in G(Xn) for all n ∈ N , and
let n∈NDn be their strong product. Consider the coherent lower previsions Pn on G(Xn)
given by Pn(f) := sup {µ ∈ R : f − µ ∈ Dn}. Then the strong product SN of the marginal
lower previsions Pn, n ∈ N satisfies
SN (f) = sup {µ ∈ R : f − µ ∈ n∈NDn} .
Proof. Assume first of all that Dn is a maximal coherent set of desirable gambles for all n in
N . Then it follows that Pn is a linear prevision, which we denote by Pn, for all n ∈ N . The
strong product of the linear previsions Pn, n ∈ N coincides with their linear independent
product ×n∈NPn, which is also their independent natural extension, by Proposition 10
from De Cooman et al. (2011). Since we have proved in Theorem 21 that this is the
coherent lower prevision associated with ⊗n∈NDn = n∈NDn, we conclude that the strong
product n∈NDn is associated with the strong product of the linear previsions Pn.
We move next to the general case. Fix any gamble f on XN . Consider any real number
µ < SN (f). For any n ∈ N , consider any maximal coherent set of desirable gambles
Mn ∈ m(Dn), and the associated linear prevision Pn, then clearly Pn ∈ M(Pn). Hence
×n∈NPn(f) ≥ SN (f) > µ, and we infer from the arguments above that then necessarily
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f − µ ∈ ⊗n∈NMn. Hence f − µ ∈ n∈NDn. This leads to the conclusion that SN (f) ≤
sup {µ ∈ R : f − µ ∈ n∈NDn}.
Conversely, consider any real number µ such that f − µ ∈ n∈NDn. Consider arbitrary
Pn ∈ M(Pn), n ∈ N , then there are maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles Mn ∈
m(Dn) inducing them: let Dn be the set of strictly desirable gambles that induces Pn, given
by Eq. (3). This set is coherent by Walley (1991, Theorem 3.8.1). Consider the set Dn∪Dn,
and let us show that it is coherent. Condition D2 holds trivially because it is satisfied by Dn.
To see that D3 holds, taking into account that both Dn and Dn are coherent sets of gambles,
and in particular cones, it suffices to show that for any gamble f ∈ Dn and any g ∈ Dn, their
sum f+g belongs to Dn∪Dn. Consider thus such gambles f, g. If f ∈ G(Xn)>0, then it also
belongs to Dn and as a consequence f + g ∈ Dn; on the other hand, if f ∈ Dn \ G(Xn)>0,
it follows that Pn(f) > 0, whence Pn(f + g) = Pn(f) + Pn(g) ≥ Pn(f) + Pn(g) > 0,
and therefore f + g ∈ Dn. Since both Dn and Dn are coherent, we deduce from this that
condition D1 also holds, and as a consequence the set Dn ∪ Dn is indeed coherent.
Now, Theorem 5 implies that there is some maximal coherent set of desirable gambles
Mn ∈ m(Dn ∪ Dn) ⊆ m(Dn), and from Walley (1991, Theorem 3.8.3) we deduce that
Dn and Mn induce the same Pn by means of Eq. (2). But then f − µ ∈ ⊗n∈NMn, and
therefore ×n∈NPn(f) ≥ µ, using the argumentation above. Hence SN (f) ≥ µ, and therefore
SN (f) ≥ sup {µ ∈ R : f − µ ∈ n∈NDn}.
Together with Theorem 21 and the fact that the strong product of lower previsions may
strictly dominate their independent natural extension [see Example 9.3.4 in Walley, 1991],
this also shows that the strong product of marginal sets of desirable gambles may strictly
include their independent natural extension. An explicit example will be given in Ap-
pendix A.3.
9. Conditional irrelevance and independence
The final step we take in this paper, consists in extending our results from irrelevance and
independence to a simple but common form of conditional irrelevance and independence.
Next to the variables XN in XN , we now also consider another variable Y assuming values
in a finite set Y.
Consider two disjoint subsets I and O of N . We say that XI is epistemically irrelevant
to XO when, conditional on Y , learning the value of XI does not influence or change our
beliefs about XO.
When does a set D of desirable gambles on XN × Y capture this type of conditional
epistemic irrelevance? Clearly, we should require that:
margO(DcxI , y) = margO(Dcy) for all xI ∈ XI and all y ∈ Y.
As before, for technical reasons we also allow I and O to be empty. It is clear from
the definition above that the ‘variable’ X∅, about whose constant value we are certain,
is conditionally epistemically irrelevant to any variable XO. Similarly, we see that any
variable XI is conditionally epistemically irrelevant to the ‘variable’ X∅. This seems to be
in accordance with intuition.
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Also, if Y is a singleton, then there is no uncertainty about Y and conditioning on Y
amounts to not conditioning at all: epistemic irrelevance can be seen as a special case of
conditional epistemic irrelevance.
We now want to argue that, conversely, there is a very specific and definite way in which
conditional epistemic irrelevance statements can be reduced to simple epistemic irrelevance
statements. The crucial results that allow us to establish this, are the following conceptually
very simple theorem and its corollary.
Theorem 29 (Sequential updating). Consider any subset R of N , and any coherent set
D of desirable gambles on XN × Y. Then
(Dcy)cxR = (DcxR)cy = DcxR, y for all xR ∈ XR and y ∈ Y. (20)
Proof. Fix any xR in XR and any y ∈ Y. Clearly, all three sets in Eq. (20) are subsets of
G(XN\R). So take any gamble f on XN\R, and consider the following chains of equivalences:
I{y}I{xR}f ∈ D ⇔ I{xR}f ∈ Dcy ⇔ f ∈ (Dcy)cxR
I{y}I{xR}f ∈ D ⇔ I{y}f ∈ DcxR ⇔ f ∈ (DcxR)cy
I{y}I{xR}f ∈ D ⇔ f ∈ DcxR, y.
Corollary 30 (Reduction). Consider any disjoint subsets I and O of N , and any coher-
ent set D of desirable gambles on XN × Y. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) margO(DcxI , y) = margO(Dcy) for all xI ∈ XI and all y ∈ Y;
(ii) margO((Dcy)cxI) = margO(Dcy) for all xI ∈ XI and y ∈ Y.
This tells us that a model D about (XN , Y ) represents epistemic irrelevance of XI to XO,
conditional on Y if and only if for each possible value y ∈ Y of Y , the model Dcy about XN
represents epistemic irrelevance of XI to XO.
Now suppose we have marginal conditional models DncY on Xn, n ∈ N . The notation
DncY is a concise way of representing the family of conditional models Dncy, y ∈ Y. Then
if we combine Corollary 30 and Theorem 19, we obtain the following:
Corollary 31. The smallest conditionally independent product DcY of the marginal models
DncY is given by ⊗n∈N (DncY ), meaning that for each y ∈ Y, Dcy = ⊗n∈N (Dncy).
This also shows that calculating the conditionally independent natural extension has, in
comparison with independent natural extension, an additional factor in the computational
complexity that its simply linear in the number of possible values for the conditioning
variable Y .
10. Conclusions
Sets of desirable gambles are more informative than coherent lower previsions, as we have
shown in Section 2.6, and they are helpful in avoiding problems involving zero probabilities.
Moreover, they have a simple axiomatic definition, as we have seen in Section 2.1. They
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have been overlooked for much of the development of the theory of imprecise probabilities,
and it is only in the last five or six years that more effort is being devoted to bringing this
simplifying and unifying notion to the fore.
Working with sets of desirable gambles allows us to show that the computational com-
plexity of checking whether a gamble belongs to the independent natural extension com-
pares favourably to that of computing the strong product, which has a complexity that is
exponential in the number of variables.
Our results here also show that we can model assessments of epistemic independence
easily using sets of desirable gambles, and that we can derive from them existing results for
lower previsions.
Moreover, the results in Section 7 indicate that constructing global joint models (i.e. co-
herent sets of desirable gambles) from local ones is something that can be easily and effi-
ciently done for the some types of credal networks (Cozman, 2000, 2005). The interpretation
of the graphical structure in credal networks is usually taken to be the following: for any
node (variable), conditional on its parents, the non-parent non-descendants are strongly
independent of it (Cozman, 2000, 2005). But we can replace the assumption of strong in-
dependence with the weaker one of epistemic irrelevance, as De Cooman et al. (2010), and
this tends to produce more conservative independent products.9
If we consider a credal network made up of n unconnected nodes X1, . . . , Xn, their inter-
pretation is then very simple: for any variable Xk, the remaining variables X1, . . . , Xk−1,
Xk+1, . . .Xn are epistemically irrelevant to it. The expression (18) for the independent
natural extension ⊗nk=1Dk, and the reasoning behind it in Section 7, show that ⊗nk=1Dk is
the smallest (most conservative) coherent joint set of desirable gambles that expresses the
epistemic irrelevancies in the graph.
Interestingly, we can make the network slightly more complicated by looking at the de-
velopments in Section 9, which tell us that the conditionally independent natural extension
⊗nk=1XkcY is the most conservative (conditional) joint model that reflects the independence
conditions embedded in the following graphical structure:
Y
X1 X2
. . .
Xn−1 Xn
for any variable Xk, the remaining variables X1, . . . , Xk−1, Xk+1, . . .Xn are epistemically
irrelevant to Xk, conditional on Y .
Now, any tree can be built up recursively using simple networks like the one above as
building blocks: similarly to De Cooman et al. (2010, Section 4), we can use recursion
from the leaves to the root, so that at any step we have a conditional model that we put
together into a joint one using the epistemic irrelevance/independence assessments and the
marginal extension theorem (Miranda & De Cooman, 2007), that allows us to combine
hierarchical information. This suggests that the developments in this paper can be used to
9. See also Section 8 for more details about strong independence; we surmise that the computational
complexity of dealing with strong products is worse than that for computing the independent natural
extension.
33
De Cooman & Miranda
good advantage in finding efficient algorithms for inference in credal trees under epistemic
irrelevance, using sets of desirable gambles as uncertainty models. This approach could
build on the ideas proposed by De Cooman et al. (2010) and Destercke and De Cooman
(2008) in the context of credal trees with lower previsions as local uncertainty models,
but make them more general and also more directly amenable to simple assessment and
elicitation for the local models. This would have interesting applications in dealing with
hidden Markov models with imprecise transition and emission models, which are, of course,
special credal trees.
We expect that generalising those algorithms towards more general credal networks
(polytrees, . . . ) will be more difficult, and will have to rely heavily on the pioneering work
of Moral (2005) on graphoid properties for epistemic irrelevance. In this sense, it would
be interesting to model other assumptions of independence between variables using sets
of desirable gambles, for instance intermediate assumptions between epistemic irrelevance
and independence (that is, epistemic irrelevance for some pairs of sets of variables only).
Moreover, algorithms for computing the irrelevant and the independent natural extension,
as well as the strong product, need to be devised.
Other open problems would be to generalise our work to infinite sequences of random
variables, which would allow us to deal with unbounded trees, and, as we have already
discussed in the paper, to establish the associativity of the strong product and to extend
our results to variables taking values on infinite spaces.
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Appendix A. Examples
In this appendix, we have gathered a number of examples and counterexamples.
A.1 Independent natural extension need not preserve maximality
Let X = {0, 1} and let M be the subset of G(X) given by
M := {f ∈ G(X) : f(0) + f(1) > 0 or f(0) = −f(1) > 0} .
0
1
M
Then it is easy to see thatM is a coherent set of desirable gambles. It is
moreover maximal: if some non-zero f /∈M, then either f(0) + f(1) < 0,
whence −f(0) − f(1) > 0 and then −f > 0, or f(0) = −f(1) < 0 and
then −f(0) = f(1) > 0, which means that −f ∈M.
Let N = {1, 2}, X1 = X2 = X andM1 =M2 =M. The independent
natural extension of M1 and M2 is given by
M1 ⊗M2 := posi
(
G(X{1,2})>0 ∪ Airr{1}→{2} ∪ Airr{2}→{1}
)
=
{
h1 + h2 : h1 ∈ Airr{1}→{2} ∪ {0}, h2 ∈ Airr{2}→{1} ∪ {0}
}
\ {0},
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taking into account that all non-negative gambles belong to both Airr{1}→{2} and Airr{2}→{1}
and thatAirr{1}→{2}∪{0} andAirr{2}→{1}∪{0} are convex cones. Recall that h1 ∈ Airr{1}→{2}∪{0}
iff h1(0, ·) ∈ M ∪ {0} and h1(1, ·) ∈ M ∪ {0}, and similarly that h2 ∈ Airr{2}→{1} ∪ {0} iff
h2(·, 0) ∈ M ∪ {0} and h2(·, 1) ∈ M ∪ {0}. This means that any gamble h in M1 ⊗M2
can be expressed as
h(0, 0) = α+ , h(0, 1) = β + µ, h(1, 0) = γ + λ, h(1, 1) = δ + η,
where α, . . . , η are real numbers satisfying the following constraints:
α+ β > 0 or α = −β ≥ 0
γ + δ > 0 or γ = −δ ≥ 0
+ λ > 0 or  = −λ ≥ 0
µ+ η > 0 or µ = −η ≥ 0
max{α, γ, , µ} > 0.
Then the gamble h given by h(0, 0) = h(1, 1) = −1 and h(0, 1) = h(1, 0) = 1 does not belong
to M1 ⊗M2: since h(0, 0) + h(0, 1) + h(1, 0) + h(1, 1) = 0, we should have α = −β ≥ 0,
γ = −δ ≥ 0,  = −λ ≥ 0 and µ = −η ≥ 0, and this implies that h(0, 0) ≥ 0, a contradiction.
But −h does not belong toM1⊗M2 either, because h(0, 0) +h(0, 1) +h(1, 0) +h(1, 1) = 0
similarly implies that −h(1, 1) ≤ 0. Hence, the independent natural extension of M1 and
M2 is not maximal.
A.2 A maximal independent product of maximal sets
Next, we construct an example of an independent product of maximal sets that is again
maximal.
Consider the spaces X1 and X2, and the maximal marginal coherent sets of desirable
gambles M1 and M2 as in Section A.1. Now consider the set of desirable gambles M′
defined by
M′ := {h ∈ G(XN ) : h(0, 0) + h(0, 1) + h(1, 0) + h(1, 1) > 0}
∪ {h ∈ G(XN ) : h(0, 0) + h(0, 1) + h(1, 0) + h(1, 1) = 0 and
[h(0, 0) > 0 or h(0, 0) = 0, h(0, 1) > 0 or h(0, 0) = h(0, 1) = 0, h(1, 0) > 0]}.
We first show thatM1⊗M2 ⊆M′. According to the discussion in Section A.1, any gamble
h inM1⊗M2 satisfies h(0, 0) = α+ , h(0, 1) = β+µ, h(1, 0) = γ+λ, and h(1, 1) = δ+ η,
where in particular
min{α+ β, γ + δ, + λ, µ+ η} ≥ 0,
whence
h(0, 0) + h(0, 1) + h(1, 0) + h(1, 1) = (α+ ) + (β + µ) + (γ + λ) + (µ+ η)
= (α+ β) + (γ + δ) + (+ λ) + (µ+ η) ≥ 0.
If h(0, 0)+h(0, 1)+h(1, 0)+h(1, 1) = 0, this implies that α+β = γ+δ = +λ = µ+η = 0,
and therefore, again looking at the characterisation of M1 ⊗ M2 in Section A.1, that
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α = −β ≥ 0, γ = −δ ≥ 0,  = −λ ≥ 0 and µ = −η ≥ 0 This implies in particular
that h(0, 0) = α +  ≥ 0. So we see that either h(0, 0) > 0, and in that case h ∈ M′, or
h(0, 0) = 0. But this implies that α =  = β = λ = 0. And then h(0, 1) = µ ≥ 0, so again
we have either h(0, 1) > 0, in which case h ∈ M′, or h(0, 1) = µ = δ = 0. But now it
follows from the conditions imposed on the α, . . . , η in Section A.1 that h(1, 0) = γ > 0,
which again means that h belongs to M′. So, indeed, M1 ⊗M2 ⊆M′.
We now show that M′ is a maximal coherent set of desirable gambles. It is easy to
see that M′ is coherent. To show that it is maximal, consider any non-zero gamble h in
G(X{1,2}); then there are three possibilities. If h(0, 0) + h(1, 0) + h(0, 1) + h(1, 1) > 0, then
h ∈M′ and −h /∈M′. If h(0, 0)+h(1, 0)+h(0, 1)+h(1, 1) < 0, then −h ∈M′ and h /∈M′.
And if h(0, 0) + h(1, 0) + h(0, 1) + h(1, 1) = 0, then exactly one of h,−h belongs to M′.
To conclude, note thatM′ is an independent product ofM1 andM2 because of Propo-
sition 24.
A.3 The strong product may strictly include the independent natural
extension
The following example is an adaptation of Walley (1991, Example 9.3.4).
Consider X = {0, 1} and let P be the coherent lower prevision determined by P ({0}) =
2/5 and P (1) = 1/2, so we have for all f ∈ G(X) that:
P (f) = min
{
1
2
f(0) +
1
2
f(1),
2
5
f(0) +
3
5
f(1)
}
.
With P we can associate the coherent set of (strictly) desirable gambles by Eq. (3):
D := {f : f > 0 or P (f) > 0} .
Now let N = {1, 2}, X1 = X2 = X and D1 = D2 = D. Consider the gamble h on X{1,2}
determined by
h(0, 0) = h(1, 1) =
51
100
, h(0, 1) = h(1, 0) = − 49
100
.
To see that D1⊗D2 is strictly included in D1D2, we will show that h belongs to D1D2
but not to D1 ⊗D2.
For the latter claim, consider any gambles h1 ∈ Airr{1}→{2} and h2 ∈ Airr{2}→{1}, and assume
ex absurdo that h ≥ h1+h2. Then we see that (h1+h2)(0, 0) = α+, (h1+h2)(0, 1) = β+µ,
(h1 + h2)(1, 0) = γ + λ and (h1 + h2)(1, 1) = δ + η, where the real numbers α, . . . , η must
satisfy the following constraints:
max{α, β} > 0 and min
{
1
2
α+
1
2
β,
2
5
α+
3
5
β
}
≥ 0
max{γ, δ} > 0 and min
{
1
2
γ +
1
2
δ,
2
5
γ +
3
5
δ
}
≥ 0
max{, λ} > 0 and min
{
1
2
+
1
2
λ,
2
5
+
3
5
λ
}
≥ 0
max{µ, η} > 0 and min
{
1
2
µ+
1
2
η,
2
5
µ+
3
5
η
}
≥ 0.
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As a consequence,
2
5
(α+ ) +
3
5
(β + γ + δ + µ+ λ+ η)
= (
2
5
α+
3
5
β) + (
2
5
+
3
5
λ) +
6
5
(
1
2
γ +
1
2
δ) +
6
5
(
1
2
µ+
1
2
η) ≥ 0,
but on the other hand
2
5
(α+ ) +
3
5
(β + γ + δ + µ+ λ+ η)
≤ 2
5
h(0, 0) +
3
5
(h(0, 1) + h(1, 0) + h(1, 1)) = − 39
500
,
a contradiction. This implies that h does not belong to D1 ⊗D2.
For the former claim, consider arbitrary maximal coherent set of desirable gambles
M1 ∈ m(D1) and M2 ∈ m(D2). Then it follows from the discussion in Section 2.6 that
M1 induces a linear prevision P1 ≥ P 1, and that M2 induces a linear prevision P2 ≥ P 2.
But then it follows from the discussion in Example 9.3.4 in Ref. (Walley, 1991) that
(P1 × P2)(h) ≥ 1
100
> 0,
which tells us that h belongs to the set of strictly desirable gambles that induces P1 × P2,
because of Eq. (3). Since that is the smallest coherent set of desirable gambles that induces
P1 × P2, and since M1 ⊗M2 is another such set, by Theorem 28, we deduce that h ∈
M1 ⊗M2. It follows that indeed h ∈ D1 D2.
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